The Eritrean government's concerns about Ethiopia's threats to its sovereignty are legitimate.

No country has the right to threaten another nation's territorial integrity or seize its territory by force.

But what about the rights and freedoms of the Eritrean people themselves?

More than 30 years after independence, Eritrea has never held national elections. Its 1997 constitution remains unimplemented. There is no independent judiciary, no political opposition, no free press, and no meaningful government accountability.

Indefinite national service has deprived generations of young Eritreans of their freedom and future. Thousands have fled their homeland, often risking their lives in search of opportunities and basic human rights.

The Eritrean government demands that Ethiopia respect international law. But when will it respect the fundamental rights of its own people?

It calls on the international community to defend Eritrea's sovereignty while denying Eritreans the right to participate in shaping their country's future.

We can condemn Ethiopian aggression without defending authoritarian rule in Eritrea. We can defend Eritrea's borders while demanding democracy, constitutional government, an independent judiciary, and an end to indefinite national service.

Eritreans did not sacrifice so much for independence simply to live without freedom, elections, or basic human rights.

Sovereignty belongs to the people, not to a president or a political party. They know they are doing the people wrong but they openly dont care.

Eritrea deserves protection from external aggression. Eritreans deserve protection from internal repression.

the ethiopian gov provided this as evidence to diplomatic community in Addis Abeba.

https://x.com/BehiwotTilahun/status/2109695738489840076?s=20

'Breaking:
Captured weapons and documents were presented to ambassadors in Addis Ababa.'

after going through the information, my view is that a direct war with eritrea is unlikely right now. whatever advantage ethiopia might have in population or economic resources, fighting a neighbouring country while dealing with multiple insurgencies would be an enormous gamble. it could stretch the military, cause heavy losses, drag on for years and give insurgent groups fresh confidence. to me, that would go beyond a miscalculation it could be strategically suicidal.

https://shabait.com/2026/10/14/information-note-regarding-eritrea-ethiopia-relations/

Over the past three years, the Government of Ethiopia has sustained and progressively intensified its unprovoked war agenda against Eritrea under the rubric of acquiring “Sovereign access to the sea, through negotiations if possible and force if necessary”, in violation of the UN Charter and the 2018 Peace and Friendship Agreement between the two countries. Ethiopia’s acts of aggression and destabilization include the pronounced establishment of a Naval Force with jurisdiction over and strategic depth in Eritrea’s southern coastal region.

Taken together, these developments are tantamount to, and constitute, a brazen violation of Eritrea’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, in breach of the prohibition of the threat or use of force under Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations.

Ethiopia’s Red Sea Access Campaign: Background and Recent Developments

The principal developments include:

In July 2023, PM Abiy Ahmed delivered a closed-door briefing to federal lawmakers and military officials – subsequently broadcasted to the public – explicitly claiming an “inherent right” to the Red Sea, framing it as an existential imperative that would inevitably lead to military conflict if ignored.

This expansionist claim was amplified by the President of the Oromia region (October 7, 2023) and senior ambassadors, who provocatively declared that traditional Oromo celebrations (Irrecha) would be held along the Red Sea coast, while military generals publicly displayed maps incorporating Eritrea’s southern coastline.

On October 13, 2023, PM Abiy publicly declared an ambition to secure “sovereign access to the sea by any means necessary,” stating Ethiopia would not remain a “prisoner of geography.”

In subsequent briefings to the House of the People’s Representatives on February 2, 2026, Abiy drew direct inspiration from Israel’s illegal annexation of the Golan Heights, signaling a clear intent to annex the sovereign Eritrean Port of Assab by force.

During the 38th AU Summit in Addis Ababa, held on February 15, 2025 (during an executive council session), an official map incorporating sovereign Eritrean and Somali territories – including the Port of Assab – was displayed directly behind the Ethiopian President breaching continental and international law.

On September 2, 2025, Major General Teshome Gemechu, Head of Foreign Relations Department of the Ethiopian National Defense Forces stated, “the Red Sea belongs to Ethiopia. We will take it back at any cost! Assab is Ethiopia’s Red Sea province.”

In an absolute violation of international law, on October 28, 2025, the Prime Minister further publicly bragged that he “has found no document that asserts Eritrea’s independence,” while PP state media channels actively called on citizens to mobilize and “withdraw” recognition of Eritrea’s 1993 sovereignty, labeling it a “historical mistake.”

On November 3, 2025, Ethiopia’s former Ambassador to Kenya, Retired General Bacha Debele, explicitly stated in a public interview that the Port of Assab is an “Ethiopian asset” and alluded to operational strategies to seize it using military force.

On February 22, 2026, during a Special Forces graduation in Awassa, PM Abiy defined the military’s mission as “ensuring and maintaining the security of the Red Sea from the edge of Somalia to the Port of Massawa.”

On September 21, 2026, Ambassador Dina Mufti, a member of the Federal Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee, reiterated that Ethiopia’s quest for sovereign sea access is non-negotiable and aggressively demanded international pressure against Eritrea.

On 27 September last month, the Ethiopian Army’s Deputy Chief of Staff, General Abebaw Tadesse, openly declared that “the offensive launched in Tigray will not stop there”. He went on to state: “Mekelle is a mere stop-over, our ultimate destination is Assab; our main objective is to install our flag in the Red Sea”.

On October 12, 2026, Lencho Bati, Director General of Ethiopia’s Diaspora Service, ranted “the Ethiopian military that suffered in the deserts of Tigray, will not stop before taking off its shoes by the Red Sea and wash its feet on Eritrean Red Sea waters.”

As recent as October 11, 2026 – the Ethiopian Air Force Commander General Yilma Merdasa stated that their main goal is the recovery of sea access, particularly through the Eritrean port of Assab.

The Pretoria Agreement and Ethiopia’s Internal Political and Security Challenges

Eritrea’s position is that the Pretoria Agreement of 2 November 2022 is an internal Ethiopian agreement between the Federal Government of Ethiopia and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). Eritrea is not a party to the Agreement and has no role in its implementation.

Allegations of Support for Armed Groups Targeting Eritrea

The Government of Eritrea further raises concerns that Ethiopian territory has been used to host anti-Eritrea armed groups. In this context, Eritrea draws attention to the Red Sea Afar Democratic Organization (RSADO), which is profiled by the Terrorism Research & Analysis Consortium (TRAC) and has been associated in open-source reporting with armed activity directed against the Eritrean Government. Moreover, Ethiopia continues to publicly harbor various ‘color-revolution’ fringe groups, whose terrorist nature was confirmed by Germany’s Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office. Eritrea further maintains that other anti-Eritrean groups have also operated from Ethiopian territory and have received all kinds military and logistical support.

Deterioration of Eritrea–Ethiopia Diplomatic Relations

The deterioration of diplomatic relations between Eritrea and Ethiopia must be considered against the broader backdrop of escalating rhetoric on Red Sea access and growing bilateral tensions. From Eritrea’s perspective, the diplomatic rupture was preceded by developments suggesting a progressive weakening of normal bilateral communication.

The following sequence of events warrants clarification and scrutiny:

Since May 2026: The Ethiopian Embassy in Asmara ceased responding to official communications and substantially curtailed engagement with Eritrea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, impeding established diplomatic channels.

8 August 2026: The Ethiopian government effectively abandoned its Embassy in Asmara at 5:00 PM, when the remaining four Ethiopian diplomatic staff members quietly left Eritrea via Tarco Airways. They intentionally failed to notify the Eritrean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, violating the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. The circumstances of their departure would merit clarification considering the normal requirements of diplomatic practice and communication between receiving and sending States.

1 October 2026: the Ethiopian government following its announcement to close its Embassy in Asmara on October 1, 2026, expelled all ten Eritrean diplomats, including the Chargé d’affaires of the Embassy accredited as Permanent Representative to AU and UNECA as well as all three diplomats covering the African Union (AU) and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA). This act flagrantly violates the 2000 AU constitutive Act, the 1965 General Convention on the Immunities and Privileges of the OAU, the 2008 AU-Ethiopia Headquarters Agreements, and the 1958 UNECA-Ethiopia Headquarters Agreement.

As it happens, what Ethiopia initiated against Eritrea is not an isolated incident; it has since solidified into a dangerous pattern of regional destabilization and expansionism across the Horn of Africa, as demonstrated by the following actions:

Ethiopia continues to provide military and logistical support to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) through a secret military base in the Benishangul-Gumuz region, serving as an active conduit for weapons, drones, and mercenaries that have worsened the catastrophic civil war in Sudan.

The Ethiopian government has been involved in a massive shopping spree of weapons sponsored by destabilizing external actors.

To the Security Council

As explicitly stated in statement to the UNSC on 9 October last week, Eritrea calls on the UN Security Council to condemn Ethiopia’s deplorable declaration of war against Eritrea, which will inculcate huge devastation to the peoples of both countries and destabilize the whole region, and take the requisite deterrent measures against it in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

Eritrea calls on the Security Council to urge Ethiopia to respect Eritrea’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and to refrain from actions and rhetoric aimed at undermining Eritrea’s independence and territorial integrity.

Conclusion

There is no good faith dispute between Eritrea and Ethiopia. The tensions stems from and is fully predicated on Ethiopia’s unprovoked and declared policy of aggression against Eritrea.

What is the history of this village?

Touchy subject here for some but I’m curious to know if there is are any Eritreans at all in this sub who are unionists/think Eritrea and Ethiopia should be one country.

Eritrea needs to host a UCI Road World Championship at least once! The Asmara-Massawa highway is just a cyclists dream!

War in the Horn of Africa

Expert: "Eritrea miscalculated. Now it is too late to turn back."

Conflict expert Kjetil Tronvoll believes that Eritrea's attack on Ethiopia could herald the end of the totalitarian regime. President Isaias will likely have to strike a deal or step down himself.

Interview

/

Fabian Sommavilla

October 14, 2026, 05:00

111 posts

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Two men stand smiling side by side; one is handing a key to the other. The flags of Ethiopia and Eritrea are visible in the background.

A picture from better times: Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and Eritrean President Isaias Afewerki celebrate the opening of the Eritrean embassy in Ethiopia together in July 2018. Today, the two countries are at war.

AFP/MICHAEL TEWELDE

A new war is raging in the Horn of Africa. Following the devastating Ethiopian civil war—which involved Eritrea and was fought against the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) between 2020 and 2022—Eritrea set its sights on the Ethiopian central government in Addis Ababa this autumn, joining forces with a rebel alliance led by the TPLF. Peace and conflict researcher Kjetil Tronvoll of the Oslo New University College explains in this interview what lies behind Eritrea's ill-conceived "flight forward," how this is destabilizing the country's totalitarian regime, and why the war could trigger a conflagration across the region.

STANDARD: It is very difficult to obtain reliable information from the region. What do you know? What do your sources say? Has the Eritrean army actually penetrated deep into Ethiopia? Tronvoll: Yes, the Eritrean army penetrated deep into Ethiopia; numerous sources and visual evidence confirm this. They were on the outskirts of the Tigrayan capital, Mekele, and intended to push even further south. A large number of troops were involved, equipped with heavy weaponry, artillery, and armored vehicles; direct clashes occurred with the Ethiopian army and the Tigray Peace Force—a group that, like the Ethiopian government, opposes the TPLF’s regional leadership in Tigray. However, Eritrea withdrew quite rapidly following the Ethiopian army’s counter-offensives and the use of air and drone strikes. The fighting took place primarily in rural areas rather than in cities. TPLF troops remain stationed in only a few areas—specifically in the mountains of central Tigray and along the border—but many fighters are abandoning their positions in haste and returning to their villages. High-ranking commanders have also surrendered to government forces.

Members of the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) pose in front of Alula Aba Nega International Airport in Mekele. The soldiers are wearing camouflage uniforms and red berets; some are armed with rifles. An airport building and a clear sky are visible in the background.

Ethiopian troops after recapturing the Mekele airport.

AFP/-

STANDARD: Why is Eritrea doing this? They are providing Ethiopia—which has seemingly been waiting for years for a war that might secure access to the sea—with a legal basis for a war of self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter.

Tronvoll: Eritrea has been interfering in Ethiopian affairs in a destabilizing and destructive manner since the 1990s—economically, socially, politically, and in terms of security. This is nothing new. Eritrea funded and organized armed Ethiopian opposition groups until Abiy Ahmed came to power in Addis Ababa in 2018. From 2020 to 2022, Eritrea and Ethiopia then fought side by side in the war against Tigray. However, immediately after the signing of the Pretoria Agreement—which ended the Ethiopian civil war—relations between Asmara and Addis Ababa deteriorated once again because Isaias Afwerki, the President of Eritrea, failed to achieve his goal: the eradication of the TPLF.

STANDARD: Was the failure to include Eritrea in the Pretoria Agreement between the Ethiopian government and the TPLF a fundamental flaw of the deal?

Tronvoll: Yes! It was viewed as a domestic agreement following a civil war, rather than an internationalized conflict. Addis Ababa’s goal was not the eradication of the TPLF, but its capitulation. When the Ethiopian government sought to disarm Amhara forces in 2023 due to uprisings in the region, the Fano militia gained strength and was promptly supplied with resources by Eritrea once again. Then, when the "Alliance of Ethiopian People's Forces for Survival" formed against the government in Addis Ababa a few weeks ago, Eritrea was once again the driving force behind the effort to merge Fano and the TPLF.

STANDARD: But why is Eritrea attacking now, of all times?

Tronvoll: On one hand, the calculation made in Eritrea was purely rational and military. The country has little territory and, with a population of 2.5 million, is much smaller than Ethiopia, which has nearly 140 million people. Eritrea therefore sought to establish strategic depth by creating a buffer zone on the Ethiopian side of the border, as President Isaias harbored legitimate concerns regarding the Ethiopian government's plans to secure access to the sea. Isaias does not want a strong Ethiopia and simply refuses to grant them that access to the ocean, even though it would clearly be a win-win situation for both sides. After all, Eritrea isn't even using the port at Assab. Yet Isaias is convinced that only a weak Ethiopia can guarantee Eritrea's security. And indeed, many in Ethiopia believe that the former province of Eritrea should be brought back into the fold of the motherland.

STANDARD: So, was the attack an act of desperation?

Tronvoll: Yes, an attempt to topple the new "king"—as they call Abiy. Of course, hubris on the part of Eritrea and Isaias also plays a role, as they believe themselves to be invincible. However, they failed to keep pace with the evolution of modern warfare, such as drone combat. They also overestimated the TPLF. Yet the TPLF has become alienated from the people of Tigray. They are no longer the defenders of Tigray; they have become the army of the region's political rulers. And the people of Tigray have had enough of the TPLF politicians—of their mismanagement and their corruption.

A damaged multi-story building with broken windows that houses Tigray TV, the state broadcaster for the Tigray region of Ethiopia. The damage is the result of a drone strike in Mekelle on September 27, 2026. The sky is clear, and vegetation is visible in front of the building.

The building housing Tigray TV, the region's news broadcaster, following an Ethiopian drone strike.

AFP/-

STANDARD: How does that manifest itself?

Tronvoll: Government troops are behaving very differently than they did just a few years ago. In the run-up to the civil war, starting in 2020, Abiy Ahmed had spent two years stoking hostility toward Tigray. That had triggered a sense of unity within Tigray born of a sheer will to survive. But this time, Abiy is completely calm; he makes no comment on the TPLF’s transgressions, and the Ethiopian army, too, is trying its best to distinguish between combatants and civilians. People also feel much safer because the government sends troops from the allied Tigray Peace Force ahead during its efforts to retake territory. Eritrea miscalculated—underestimating the dynamics—and now it is too late to turn back. Ethiopians have been warning about this scenario for years, including at the UN. They have been preparing for years to exercise their legitimate right to self-defense.

STANDARD: This estrangement between the TPLF and the people also goes some way toward explaining how an alliance could be formed with Eritrea—an army involved in numerous war crimes against the people of Tigray during the 2020–2022 war.

Tronvoll: Yes, to some extent. However, the opportunistic shifting of alliances is the norm in this region of the world—part of a political culture where elites believe they can do whatever they want to the people. That stems from a feudal history.

STANDARD: What options are available to Abiy Ahmed, aside from capturing access to the sea? Somalia’s president recently claimed that they had never been contacted regarding a deal...

Tronvoll: That’s bullshit. There were several discussions. But the government in Mogadishu can’t even control Mogadishu. So, they certainly can’t guarantee a secure coastline for long-term trade. Ethiopia’s negotiations with Somaliland met with resistance from Somalia and the African Union. Djibouti is congested and gouges everyone. Abiy even managed to reach three deals with Eritrea during negotiations that lasted a year and a half, yet Isaias never signed them. Abiy wants, at the very least, sovereign control and a long-term lease for a naval base and a commercial port. They view having both as a necessity to secure logistics chains, and they want to project power in the region using air and naval forces.

STANDARD: Could this be the beginning of the end for Isaias’s dictatorship in Eritrea?

Tronvoll: I’ve said this before, and he is still there. Dictators are hard to get rid of, but I hope for the sake of the people of Eritrea that they are liberated from the regime. It depends on whether Ethiopia continues its offensive on Eritrean soil. I can’t assess that yet, although there have already been clashes at the border near Assab—likely initiated by Ethiopia. What is clear, however, is that if Ethiopia advances further, Isaias has exactly two options: He can have the TPLF offshoots in Eritrea arrested and strike a deal regarding the port of Assab to save his own skin. He only cares about himself and his power anyway, and wants to avoid death or exile. That might well be Abiy’s actual plan, because governing a dysfunctional Eritrea—a "failed state"—is not in his interest. Option two is likely his ousting.

STANDARD: Won’t Egypt or Sudan protect him from that?

Tronvoll: Sudan lacks the capacity. Egypt has the capacity but likely no interest in entering a direct confrontation with Ethiopia, given that Israel stands on Ethiopia’s side—and Israel, in turn, has no interest in the Red Sea becoming a region dominated by Islamic countries. The UAE has long been on Ethiopia’s side, and the Houthis are involved as well. In any case, it would be problematic for the US if two of its major security partners in the region—Israel and Egypt—were to fight each other in a proxy war; Washington would likely dissuade them from doing so. At the moment, I consider it unlikely, but there is a risk of it escalating into a regional conflagration.

STANDARD: How will Abiy deal with the remaining rebellions against him, should he decisively defeat the TPLF? Tronvoll: We shouldn't write off the TPLF completely just yet, even if things look that way right now. But clearly, if they are defeated, the only remaining effective fighting unit in the alliance would be the Fano—a classic guerrilla group. They cannot be defeated by drones alone; ground troops would be required. This conflict will continue, though Abiy is largely indifferent to it as long as his palace in Addis Ababa isn't under threat. Ethiopia has always had to deal with regional uprisings. (Fabian Sommavilla, October 14, 2026)

A middle-aged man with gray hair and a beard is wearing a dark jacket and a white shirt. He stands before a solid blue background with his arms crossed, smiling slightly at the camera.

Peace and conflict researcher Kjetil Tronvoll.

ONH

Kjetil Tronvoll (60) has conducted extensive fieldwork in Eritrea, Ethiopia, and a dozen other African countries. He is considered one of the world's leading experts on Ethiopia and Eritrea and has served as an advisor on political reconciliation processes and international peace mediation initiatives.