War in the Horn of Africa
Expert: "Eritrea miscalculated. Now it is too late to turn back."
Conflict expert Kjetil Tronvoll believes that Eritrea's attack on Ethiopia could herald the end of the totalitarian regime. President Isaias will likely have to strike a deal or step down himself.
Interview
/
Fabian Sommavilla
October 14, 2026, 05:00
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Two men stand smiling side by side; one is handing a key to the other. The flags of Ethiopia and Eritrea are visible in the background.
A picture from better times: Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and Eritrean President Isaias Afewerki celebrate the opening of the Eritrean embassy in Ethiopia together in July 2018. Today, the two countries are at war.
AFP/MICHAEL TEWELDE
A new war is raging in the Horn of Africa. Following the devastating Ethiopian civil war—which involved Eritrea and was fought against the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) between 2020 and 2022—Eritrea set its sights on the Ethiopian central government in Addis Ababa this autumn, joining forces with a rebel alliance led by the TPLF. Peace and conflict researcher Kjetil Tronvoll of the Oslo New University College explains in this interview what lies behind Eritrea's ill-conceived "flight forward," how this is destabilizing the country's totalitarian regime, and why the war could trigger a conflagration across the region.
STANDARD: It is very difficult to obtain reliable information from the region. What do you know? What do your sources say? Has the Eritrean army actually penetrated deep into Ethiopia? Tronvoll: Yes, the Eritrean army penetrated deep into Ethiopia; numerous sources and visual evidence confirm this. They were on the outskirts of the Tigrayan capital, Mekele, and intended to push even further south. A large number of troops were involved, equipped with heavy weaponry, artillery, and armored vehicles; direct clashes occurred with the Ethiopian army and the Tigray Peace Force—a group that, like the Ethiopian government, opposes the TPLF’s regional leadership in Tigray. However, Eritrea withdrew quite rapidly following the Ethiopian army’s counter-offensives and the use of air and drone strikes. The fighting took place primarily in rural areas rather than in cities. TPLF troops remain stationed in only a few areas—specifically in the mountains of central Tigray and along the border—but many fighters are abandoning their positions in haste and returning to their villages. High-ranking commanders have also surrendered to government forces.
Members of the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) pose in front of Alula Aba Nega International Airport in Mekele. The soldiers are wearing camouflage uniforms and red berets; some are armed with rifles. An airport building and a clear sky are visible in the background.
Ethiopian troops after recapturing the Mekele airport.
AFP/-
STANDARD: Why is Eritrea doing this? They are providing Ethiopia—which has seemingly been waiting for years for a war that might secure access to the sea—with a legal basis for a war of self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter.
Tronvoll: Eritrea has been interfering in Ethiopian affairs in a destabilizing and destructive manner since the 1990s—economically, socially, politically, and in terms of security. This is nothing new. Eritrea funded and organized armed Ethiopian opposition groups until Abiy Ahmed came to power in Addis Ababa in 2018. From 2020 to 2022, Eritrea and Ethiopia then fought side by side in the war against Tigray. However, immediately after the signing of the Pretoria Agreement—which ended the Ethiopian civil war—relations between Asmara and Addis Ababa deteriorated once again because Isaias Afwerki, the President of Eritrea, failed to achieve his goal: the eradication of the TPLF.
STANDARD: Was the failure to include Eritrea in the Pretoria Agreement between the Ethiopian government and the TPLF a fundamental flaw of the deal?
Tronvoll: Yes! It was viewed as a domestic agreement following a civil war, rather than an internationalized conflict. Addis Ababa’s goal was not the eradication of the TPLF, but its capitulation. When the Ethiopian government sought to disarm Amhara forces in 2023 due to uprisings in the region, the Fano militia gained strength and was promptly supplied with resources by Eritrea once again. Then, when the "Alliance of Ethiopian People's Forces for Survival" formed against the government in Addis Ababa a few weeks ago, Eritrea was once again the driving force behind the effort to merge Fano and the TPLF.
STANDARD: But why is Eritrea attacking now, of all times?
Tronvoll: On one hand, the calculation made in Eritrea was purely rational and military. The country has little territory and, with a population of 2.5 million, is much smaller than Ethiopia, which has nearly 140 million people. Eritrea therefore sought to establish strategic depth by creating a buffer zone on the Ethiopian side of the border, as President Isaias harbored legitimate concerns regarding the Ethiopian government's plans to secure access to the sea. Isaias does not want a strong Ethiopia and simply refuses to grant them that access to the ocean, even though it would clearly be a win-win situation for both sides. After all, Eritrea isn't even using the port at Assab. Yet Isaias is convinced that only a weak Ethiopia can guarantee Eritrea's security. And indeed, many in Ethiopia believe that the former province of Eritrea should be brought back into the fold of the motherland.
STANDARD: So, was the attack an act of desperation?
Tronvoll: Yes, an attempt to topple the new "king"—as they call Abiy. Of course, hubris on the part of Eritrea and Isaias also plays a role, as they believe themselves to be invincible. However, they failed to keep pace with the evolution of modern warfare, such as drone combat. They also overestimated the TPLF. Yet the TPLF has become alienated from the people of Tigray. They are no longer the defenders of Tigray; they have become the army of the region's political rulers. And the people of Tigray have had enough of the TPLF politicians—of their mismanagement and their corruption.
A damaged multi-story building with broken windows that houses Tigray TV, the state broadcaster for the Tigray region of Ethiopia. The damage is the result of a drone strike in Mekelle on September 27, 2026. The sky is clear, and vegetation is visible in front of the building.
The building housing Tigray TV, the region's news broadcaster, following an Ethiopian drone strike.
AFP/-
STANDARD: How does that manifest itself?
Tronvoll: Government troops are behaving very differently than they did just a few years ago. In the run-up to the civil war, starting in 2020, Abiy Ahmed had spent two years stoking hostility toward Tigray. That had triggered a sense of unity within Tigray born of a sheer will to survive. But this time, Abiy is completely calm; he makes no comment on the TPLF’s transgressions, and the Ethiopian army, too, is trying its best to distinguish between combatants and civilians. People also feel much safer because the government sends troops from the allied Tigray Peace Force ahead during its efforts to retake territory. Eritrea miscalculated—underestimating the dynamics—and now it is too late to turn back. Ethiopians have been warning about this scenario for years, including at the UN. They have been preparing for years to exercise their legitimate right to self-defense.
STANDARD: This estrangement between the TPLF and the people also goes some way toward explaining how an alliance could be formed with Eritrea—an army involved in numerous war crimes against the people of Tigray during the 2020–2022 war.
Tronvoll: Yes, to some extent. However, the opportunistic shifting of alliances is the norm in this region of the world—part of a political culture where elites believe they can do whatever they want to the people. That stems from a feudal history.
STANDARD: What options are available to Abiy Ahmed, aside from capturing access to the sea? Somalia’s president recently claimed that they had never been contacted regarding a deal...
Tronvoll: That’s bullshit. There were several discussions. But the government in Mogadishu can’t even control Mogadishu. So, they certainly can’t guarantee a secure coastline for long-term trade. Ethiopia’s negotiations with Somaliland met with resistance from Somalia and the African Union. Djibouti is congested and gouges everyone. Abiy even managed to reach three deals with Eritrea during negotiations that lasted a year and a half, yet Isaias never signed them. Abiy wants, at the very least, sovereign control and a long-term lease for a naval base and a commercial port. They view having both as a necessity to secure logistics chains, and they want to project power in the region using air and naval forces.
STANDARD: Could this be the beginning of the end for Isaias’s dictatorship in Eritrea?
Tronvoll: I’ve said this before, and he is still there. Dictators are hard to get rid of, but I hope for the sake of the people of Eritrea that they are liberated from the regime. It depends on whether Ethiopia continues its offensive on Eritrean soil. I can’t assess that yet, although there have already been clashes at the border near Assab—likely initiated by Ethiopia. What is clear, however, is that if Ethiopia advances further, Isaias has exactly two options: He can have the TPLF offshoots in Eritrea arrested and strike a deal regarding the port of Assab to save his own skin. He only cares about himself and his power anyway, and wants to avoid death or exile. That might well be Abiy’s actual plan, because governing a dysfunctional Eritrea—a "failed state"—is not in his interest. Option two is likely his ousting.
STANDARD: Won’t Egypt or Sudan protect him from that?
Tronvoll: Sudan lacks the capacity. Egypt has the capacity but likely no interest in entering a direct confrontation with Ethiopia, given that Israel stands on Ethiopia’s side—and Israel, in turn, has no interest in the Red Sea becoming a region dominated by Islamic countries. The UAE has long been on Ethiopia’s side, and the Houthis are involved as well. In any case, it would be problematic for the US if two of its major security partners in the region—Israel and Egypt—were to fight each other in a proxy war; Washington would likely dissuade them from doing so. At the moment, I consider it unlikely, but there is a risk of it escalating into a regional conflagration.
STANDARD: How will Abiy deal with the remaining rebellions against him, should he decisively defeat the TPLF? Tronvoll: We shouldn't write off the TPLF completely just yet, even if things look that way right now. But clearly, if they are defeated, the only remaining effective fighting unit in the alliance would be the Fano—a classic guerrilla group. They cannot be defeated by drones alone; ground troops would be required. This conflict will continue, though Abiy is largely indifferent to it as long as his palace in Addis Ababa isn't under threat. Ethiopia has always had to deal with regional uprisings. (Fabian Sommavilla, October 14, 2026)
A middle-aged man with gray hair and a beard is wearing a dark jacket and a white shirt. He stands before a solid blue background with his arms crossed, smiling slightly at the camera.
Peace and conflict researcher Kjetil Tronvoll.
ONH
Kjetil Tronvoll (60) has conducted extensive fieldwork in Eritrea, Ethiopia, and a dozen other African countries. He is considered one of the world's leading experts on Ethiopia and Eritrea and has served as an advisor on political reconciliation processes and international peace mediation initiatives.