https://www.courtilpro.be/courtilenlignes/index.php/revue/article/numero-10/courtil-papers/cecilia-or-no-name-for-the-worst

For me, a particular interesting aspect of the case is the following:

“… However, these "bad images" could surface at any moment - such as when she antagonized with insults a girl who, since her arrival, she had held in friendship (they had shared a room at the psychiatric hospital). Moreover, according to her, certain objects "evoke the bad images." First of these are what she calls "borders": the edge of the table, of her plate, of the window, or a book ("I'm afraid of corners."). Then the black points of the tiles in her family home, the clock, and more precisely, the "black numbers," the knobs on the door of a piece of furniture belonging to her parents (which remind her of filthy things). It should be noted that she recalls having been afraid, when very little, of the end of her grandfather's cane, the spokes of her father's bicycle, and the white of toilets …“

Drawing from my own experiences (as a schizophrenic), I propose that borders are particularly difficult and anxiety-provoking since they unify two opposite momentums. A border shows that something ends right here, but at the same time, something other evolves from this point and can‘t be traced to its end, eluding to infinity. This ambivalent nature of borders threatens her body to dissolve; no ending can be experienced as a soothening halt, it‘s rather hell‘s precipice. It’s like being trapped in an extending, ever changing room with wall-like things that popp up, tranform their characteristics and vanish again.

And why do the clock and, especially the black numbers cause fear? First of all, the clock is a symbol for time, whereby its perception is an illusion. Since for her, the symbolic is the real and her imaginary fails, the clock becomes a real, dreadful thing she can‘t signify. The black numbers (which — along with the clock hands — form a figure potentially resembling fingers that connects to the real phallus) stick out, standing on its own, and intrude her body.

Why the knobs on the door of a furniture belonging to her parents? Maybe this object is tied to a traumatic experience (such as the one with the boy). But foremost, it‘s the (intrusive) sensory quality — filthy — which she associates with the knob. Maybe the knobs had a „filthy“ tissue on them. Yet, I think there is more to it: for a human eye and brain, knobs are one of the „most spheric“ objects; at the same time, when inside is outside (as it’s true with the schizophrenic body) and three-dimensional objects become flat, they can stick out from the background and become intrusive. Also, knobs could remind her of eyes balls, refering to the Other‘s gaze. In this case, knobs wouldn‘t be stripped of any meaning, reflecting the void, but would become animated with a life on their own, opening the abyss.

Another interesting aspect (the paper partly points out) is the following:

„… At first, this dialogue installed itself along the lines of hypochondria: "I'm afraid I'm sick again... Oh, my heart!" (She rubbed the flat of her hand the length of her body.)

"Again," I said, "You've been sick already?"

"Sick in my head, when I was hospitalized. I don't want to go to the hospital. At the hospital, I'm afraid of falling into a coma. I'm afraid of dying."

Later, she would affirm, "I'm sick. My brain is sick. The water bypasses my stomach, maybe?"

"No. Is that what you believe?"

"My body is full of yeau.² I have cancer. I'm going to die. I have blood cancer."

Or again, "I'm going to get thin. My mother won't recognize me. I'm thin. I'm sick. When you have cancer, you're thin. They're going to feed me with a tube." …“

Clearly, she is afraid of having no name („being a no_name (symbolic hole), a no_one (the imagery dissolves), a no_body (her body image falls apart“) in her mother‘s eyes: when she gets thin, she no longer fulfills her role as an object of her mother‘s fantasy which equals annihilation. She associates this fear not with her mother, but with the doctors who are going to put a tube in her and feed her; this procedures equates an intrusion by the real phallus. The water („eau“ in French) bypassing the stomach is a direct expression of the fragmented body and the organ speech she tries to signify with the neologism „yeau“. („Yeau“ might be derived from „eau“ and „yeux“ for eyes that refer to the Other’s gaze). The stomach is no longer in place; instead, there is a hole through which the water finds its unregulated way into the blood, and from there to the heart as well as to the brain, eventually floodening her body. “Yeau“ is the description of what cannot be named: the Thing.
Words have become real, their skeletal, enriched letters are written into the subject‘s body. An unholy version of „… and the word became flesh“.

In schizophrenia, words become real in two ways: they transform into naked, dead things stripped of any meaning or morph into animated things, enriched with a sinister power. Consequently, the body is dead and emptied, no more than a shell around a large hole; or it’s possessed by the undead Thing leaving holes in the body.

What‘s your take on this?

My supervisor has me reading stuff by the post-Freudians/psychodynamic therapists and I have to say it's very heavy on phenomenology. Their goal is to describe their concepts with as much detail and variety as possible. It reminds me a lot of academia.

Lacan, and Freud, on the other hand, focus much more on the structures and principles underlying these diverse phenomena. Lacan especially almost never gives case studies but these papers are filled with them.

They both have their place I suppose but I find Lacan's writings much much more inspired.

As far as I could tell, his blog/substack/socials all hard-stopped in July last year. I tried contacting him via a few channels to no avail. Is he dead or something?

His paper on affects remains seminal for me: 'Well, it is as though certain persons were saying to analysts that they are faced with a choice of: Your affects or your language. And here the interesting thing is that if you choose your affects you lose them both, not because you will have no affects, but because without language, you won't know that any of them are yours. If you choose your language, you get your affects, only they are not the same ones as you would have had if you had chosen only them.'

I found a meme with Sphinx and a comment about Lacanian Free Thinkers when they get new analyst who is definitely subject-supposed-to know. At first I was thinking about the desire to find commodity in nothing else than finding commodity itself but could someone explain this to me better?

I mean, not a Lacan seminar, but a book by a Lacanian author.

I know the basics: the three structures, the Name-of-the-Father, foreclosure, the Borromean knot, objet petit a, desire, jouissance, etc. But I want to see how Lacanians bring all these concepts together when discussing the so-called psychotic structure, and everything it encompasses.

Again, I know some things, such as how psychosis interacts with language and the body (although not its limits), and the psychotic's jouissance. But there are other experiences that I don't know whether Lacanians take into account or how they conceptualize them.

And, I don't know whether I'm missing some psychotic experiences that might be outside my radar but that I should be aware of.

One of the most important topics for me is that I'm still not sure what exactly the so-called psychotic structure encompasses for Lacanians. I know about the modern medical use of the terms psychosis and psychotic symptoms, but I have a feeling that Lacanians might describe certain experiences as psychotic that wouldn't be considered psychotic within this model. I'm interested in florid to less florid manifestations, in case Lacanians believe that the term psychosis should be used that way or not.

And yes, I know about ordinary psychosis, and I have some texts saved to read about it at some point.

Thus, I need a good go-to book on this subject. While I think it's always useful to understand the more metapsychological aspects of Lacanian theory, I also want something that covers the more basic, straightforward descriptions of different kinds of experiences that inform the Lacanian understanding of what is considered psychotic. Something that offers a bit of both.

Thanks.

I recently found a paper written by staff who work with children suffering from infantile autism or childhood psychosis. Like Éric Laurent, they propose that there is no reason to detach infantile autism from childhood psychosis, insofar as autistic children are psychotics — specifically, schizophrenics.

“… As Eric Laurent suggested at a conference on autism at Toulouse in 1987, there is no reason to detach autism from scizophrenia.¹⁵ He makes this suggestion precisely from a case of infantile autism with whom we have worked in our institution.¹⁶ Autists thus do not pass from an autistic position to a schizophrenic position or paranoid position. In this case, they would only pass into a second period in a psychotic position. But, from the fact that they are already at work to rectify their ill Other, it seems to us more rigorous to affirm that these children are already in a psychotic position …“

https://www.courtilpro.be/courtilenlignes/index.php/revue/article/numero-4/courtil-papers/cito-tute-iucunde-a-clinic-with-an-autistic-subject

What‘s your take on it?

A vast difference between Brenner‘s theory and the concept by Éric Laurent and others is the clinical frame these people and Brenner, respectively, come from. Plainly speaking, Brenner has not worked with the more severely autistic children or adults he refers to in his book. Quite odd and misleading.

In the course of one of the recent discussions (“The autistic subject: interview with Leon Brenner”) on this subreddit, I speculated (influenced by my own experiences as an autistic schizophrenic) that the more severely autistic individuals are schizophrenics, which would explain similar symptoms and traits in patients with schizophrenia (Lacanian definition) and in those with low-functioning autism, while the less affected individuals (who largely comprise the group of late-diagnosed adults or children who form social bonds) would be paranoics or (most likely) neurotics. (On a side note, I highly doubt that most late-diagnosed adults are indeed autistic, and it‘s debatable whether the widening of the diagnostic criteria has done more good than harm. Autism has become quite an arbitrary term. It’s even debatable whether the neurotic autist is actually an autist or only has some autistic traits.)

I disagree with Brenner‘s concept of an autistic subject (as a separate structure) for various reasons, most of all the vast heterogeneity (in multiple terms, including the ability to relate to the Big Other or little other, respectively, and form social bonds, partly irrespective of their language skills) of autistic individuals, which does not align with the proposed “autistic foreclosure” (Ausstoßung) as the earliest and most extensive form of foreclosure. Thus, his theory looks fancy and may serve the narcissistic needs of those autistic individuals who are overrepresentated in social media and cultivate a nimbus of special otherness and moral superiority, but doesn’t make sense from a clinical and structural standpoint. In contrast, I find Leader’s approach more convincing. Here, autism is conceptualized as a position the subject (within any of the established structures) adopts in early infancy; it’s an attempt (of the “last-resort” type, I guess) to defend themselves from the outer world and the Real. Of note, Leader works with overt psychotics and lhas a much broader clinical experience than Brenner.

I am wondering if the most affected children (with Kanner’s autism) could be less prone to develop overt schizophrenia because of their almost complete reclusion, in which neither the Big Other nor (by and large) the little other exist. In contrast, the more severely affected children (with Kanner‘s or Asperger’s) would have the highest risk of developing overt schizophrenia later on; here, the Big Other is either non-existent or exists in a fragmented version, as the imaginary realm fails (… while it would be absent in severe Kanner’s autism). And would the early traumatic experience of an engulfing mother cause a schizophrenic child to develop asperger‘s autism rather than kanner‘s autism when the child‘s (psychic) survival depends on fulfilling the role as an object of the mother‘s fantasy?

Lastly, I am wondering if certain personality traits (contributing to the specific kind and degree of defense mechanisms at play) — along with life circumstances, especially family dynamics, parental structure, and adverse events — make it much more likely that the autistic child will later develop clinical psychosis/schizophrenia.
One could even speculate that autism is indeed on the rise (albeit to a much lesser degree than the numbers suggest) since family structures nowadays tend to weaken the paternal function while children grow up in a world of ever increasing stimuli our brains are not adapted to.

What‘s your opinion on these ideas?

I'm a third year psychology student and I spent all of summer getting into Lacanian theory, I've read books like "how to read Lacan", "introduction to the lacanian clinic", "signifier pointing at the moon", "The queerness of psychoanalysis" and so on...

But I'm having a difficult time in uni applying this lense to the given material cause the material's too reductionistic, methodical and too focused on psychopathology through the lense of books like the DSM-V

I believe diagnosis via a lacanian lense is possible because of Bruce fink's books, but he only talks about hysteria and obsessive compulsion and perversion... is there a way to understand personalities like let's say, narcissistic, schizoid, depressive, hypomanic by Lacan?

Lacan warned against (the illusion of) understanding. Yet, in my view, influenced by my own experiences, this also implies a warning not to prematurely consider a psychotic subject‘s speech as incomprehensible and deprived of meaning or even meaningless. There are multiple levels one has to separate from one another.

First: what is incomprehensible to your ear or (current state of) mind isn’t necessarily incomprehensible to another ear and mind; and what you may have failed to hear or failed to understand this time might reveal itself to you another time.

Second: what is incomprehensible isn‘t necessarily deprived of any meaning. In fact, the incomprehensible can entail the psychotic‘s truth when he himself doesn‘t know and understand what is spoken through him. This applies to schizophrenics in particular. E.g., a severely traumatized schizophrenic says, „Little ship, little ship on the wall, why are you hanging, why are you standing there?", resembling a variant of the rhyme in the well-known fairytale. She adds that she doesn‘t understand the voices here (btw: in a schizophrenic who faces the threats of impending acute fragmentation, this allusion frequently means a fragile desire and a cautious request for exploring what the voices/the Other may have said — even if the subject is rarely aware of it). What might seem to be incomprehensible, idiosyncratic speech deprived of meaning eventually turns out to be comprehensible and full of meaning: The ship is a concrete object of her childhood; it‘s a toy boat bath thermometer that played a significant role when she regularly shared a bath with her older brother, during which she saw the boy's private parts. The memory is accompanied by the occurrence of body phenomena, including the feeling of a dissolving body and self. The “little ship“ that „hangs or stands there“ is a description of what she couldn‘t symbolize. On another occasion, she only repeats "anus mundi" before falling silent and becoming near-catatonic. Being faced with the Real, the analyst feels quite confused, repulsed, and excluded, in addition to a lingering intense anxiety. Some time later, it becomes clear that the patient just repeated what was spoken to her, leaving her confused and terrified. Then, the analyst hears the signifiers "anus" and "mouth", suggesting that she might try to say that her anus and her mouth are collapsing into each other. She nods. A few sessions later, she reveals that she had an early interest in autobiographies of Holocaust survivors. Anus mundi was the name of the selection ramp in Auschwitz. Eventually, it becomes clear that by saying anus mundi, she not only tried to speak about her fragmented body, but also about the trauma of being subjected to an autocratically ruling, domineering and engulfing mother.

Third: what is incomprehensible and truly deprived of meaning isn‘t meaningless inasmuch as it‘s the subject‘s rudimentary attempt to defend himself against the Real or a glimmer of a desire to speak to the other.

Forth: what is incomprehensible for you (e.g. word salad or idiosyncratic language), can (!) be entirely comprehensible and meaningful for the subject. The subject may or may not be able to follow your request if you gently ask him to explain things in other words, if possible. Do not expect the patient to know what he’s saying just because he is a psychotic. (This is particularly relevant in the work with schizophrenics as it’s the paranoics who are most often certain, while the schizophrenics suffer from a deep-seated ontological umcertainty). Be aware that the patient may fall silent when he himself is confused what was spoken through him.

And lastly: understanding can never be complete and is an approximation to the other‘s way of thinking, speaking and experiencing. The same applies to incomprehension. Since we are all subjected to language, while the psychotic, being excluded from social discourse, experiences the weight of it, incomprehension can never be total either. If you feel that you don‘t understand anything, you‘re running against a locked door you don‘t want to open right now; thus, you‘re dealing with one of your own defense mechanisms. After all, language was never meant as a tool for communication (in terms of understanding one another); it was meant to defend the subject against the Real, including forming and cultivating social bonds that are essentially based on illusions. That‘s why we all misinterpret and misunderstand, and it‘s the neurotic who isn‘t aware of this fact unless he reflects on the function and features of language. The error is an integral part of it. The error gives rise to conflicts, even wars but is also a prerequisite for the identification with the other and for emotional connection.

Hi folks,

Due for a consult session with an analyst. I was wondering if there are any things I should know about how the sessions will be, i.e., are there any “screening questions” it’d be useful to ask to see if he’s the real deal or worth working with. Only one I can think of right now:

“Do you do the variable length session?”

I only know about this stuff from a theoretical and not clinical angle. Don’t wanna screw this up.

This website used to be my go-to for Lacan-adjacent psychoanalytic stuff, particularly when I wanted to look up more obscure concepts or explore connections between different thinkers. It was an incredibly useful resource, with a fairly extensive collection of articles on Lacan, Freud, Žižek, and psychoanalytic theory as a whole.

It's now some kind of weird Indonesian AI gambling website called LegianBET? Even the subdomains have been affected. Does anyone know what's going on or when this occurred?

I've been thinking about The Substance and how Lacanian psychoanalysis might help explain Elizabeth's relationship with Sue.

One thing that interests me is that Elizabeth doesn't simply want to be young again. She wants to be desired, admired, and recognised. Sue becomes the vehicle through which she can continue receiving that recognition, but this creates a strange situation in which Elizabeth's idealised self becomes both an extension of her identity and a rival who progressively displaces her.

Could this be read through Lacan's Mirror Stage and the Ideal-I? Sue embodies an image of wholeness and desirability that Elizabeth wants to identify with, but this identification also intensifies her alienation from her actual body.

I'm also interested in the role of the Other. Elizabeth seems unable to conceive of herself outside the gaze and desire of the entertainment industry and its audience. Has she internalised the desire of the Other to such an extent that she can no longer articulate a desire of her own?

Finally, how might we understand the film's ending through Lacan's concepts of jouissance and the Real? Is Elizabeth's grotesque final transformation a confrontation with something that cannot be accommodated within her idealised image of herself, or does that reading oversimplify the relationship between the Real and bodily horror?

I'd be interested in other Lacanian readings, particularly if you think these concepts are being applied incorrectly or if other concepts would be more useful.

… including the connection with the concept of ordinary psychosis

https://www.amp-nls.org/nls-messager/psychosis-or-radical-belief-in-the-symptom-by-eric-laurent/

edit: (I‘ve added two more papers on the subject of the „psychoanalytic treatments of psychoses“ (1) and of „ordinary psychosis“ (2) in the original post above. Also, I added a paper by Eric Porge (3) that deals (among other things) with the differences between paranoia and schizophrenia (which Lacan rarely diagnosed).

https://www.courtilpro.be/courtilenlignes/index.php/revue/article/numero-6/courtil-papers/psychoanalytic-treatments-of-the-psychoses (1)

https://lacanianworksexchange.net/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/20061126-Ordinary-Psychosis-Eric-Laurent-PN-26-trans-R-Litten.pdf (2)

https://static1.squarespace.com/static/677781acbf5dfe10b5b569e2/t/67a342b47967da02799a35cc/1738752694366/7_e_critique+vol+8.+2011.E.Porge.The++Presentation+of+Patients.English.pdf (3)

I am dropping a long quote here for two reasons. First, as a response to something I frequently hear - that a person needs some knowledge of Lacan to engage in Lacanian analysis. Second, because it’s the absolute best shorthand version of the end of analysis I have ever read.

Colette Soler, Retour sur la “fonction de la parole” p 64

A *faille*—a rift or fault—is a line of fracture separating two edges. This rift undoes the postulate of the "subject supposed to know," for as knowledge is acquired—as certain signifiers impose themselves—it turns out they were already there, yet without a subject. A rift, then: a dividing line between the two supposed entities—knowledge and the subject. How does this rift become evident to an analysand? People often speak of an act of conclusion; I myself once spoke of a "logical analysand"—remarks that place the entire responsibility for the conclusion of the transference work upon the analysand. Perhaps I have changed my mind, but what is certain is that Lacan seeks to convey that one should not rely on the analysand’s powers of comprehension; the rift will reveal itself regardless of how "stupid" the subject might be—as Lacan puts it, neither intelligence nor culture is required, only the process itself. In this process, with every revelation of signifiers whose weight or effects are glimpsed—and which the analysand finally appropriates—those signifiers inevitably call upon another (or others) to provide a reason or meaning for them, by virtue of the linguistic effect. Thus, the more one wrests an element from the unconscious, the more the unconscious asserts itself as irreducible—as irreducible as the transfinite of integers, an S₂ that remains beyond reach. Lacan has various ways of expressing this: the more the unconscious is interpreted, the more it proves to be unconscious; indeed, analysis renders the unconscious all the more "hardened." In the diachrony of an analysis, there is no *agalma* that the speech of transference can reach. The fact that there is a time for understanding—or even concluding—specific to each individual is secondary to this structure, which is nothing other than, to quote, the "real that emerges in language." After this turning point, what remains is what Lacan termed the "desert of analysis." This is the post-*passe* phase.

Imaginary is the picture: you imagine a future

symbolic is "are we exclusive"

real is the stuff you can't put into words, like the shock of your first fight.

Is this accurate? or this is just typical IG Lacan content https://www.instagram.com/p/DeJo-3VzLx2/

Hello!

I've seen a bit of Lacan's writings on social media and they seemed really interesting. I don't claim by any means to understand psychology, but psychology and, closer to my field, psychiatry, were subjects I've always been fascinated with. I've read a bit of Freud when I was younger, Camus and Kafka during graduation and, recently, I've read Irvin D. Yalom's Staring At The Sun, all of which I thoroughly enjoyed, so I do have a bit of experience with French philosopher's and psychology... A bit. I wanted to know where to start, since I know his writing is considered very challenging.

"The subject is a loop between S1 and S2, the master signifier and knowledge, and the Möbius strip shows that inside and outside are continuous." I've read that, or something close to it, a hundred times. Today I'm bringing proof that this is not what Lacan says, in his own words, with dates and pages so you can look the quotes up yourselves. And a thirty-second test that shows why it matters.

To test it out, I used two crayons—like any responsible adult.

Take a closed chain of signifiers and label it so that neighbours always differ: S1, S2, S1, S2… With four signifiers it works. With three it doesn't: S1, S2, S1, and the last one sits right next to the first. And this is a big problem! Any odd number fails the same way. So if the loop means two signifiers, or two kinds of signifier, taking turns around the chain, it breaks for every chain of odd length.

Here, I begin with some corrections to our Lacanian common sense:

1. For Lacan, S1 and S2 are indices that any signifier can take, not two signifiers.
2. The Möbius strip is not a picture of "inside = outside": it is the cut itself, and the edge of that cut goes around twice.
3. Put the two together and the loop works for every chain, on that double loop, where each signifier is S1 on one lap and S2 on the other.

Now I will show you quotes regarding Lacan's thoughts on each matter.

What Lacan says S1 and S2 are

1. An index, not the signifier that comes first. S1 "means signifier index 1": not the signifier that takes precedence, but the one in whose name someone, a subject, shows up. Closing address of the EFP study days "Les mathèmes de la psychanalyse", 2 Nov 1976, Lettres de l'École freudienne no. 21 (1977), p. 506. ‹S1, qui veut dire … se manifeste›
2. A mark on "anything at all". His S1 has no other sense than to punctuate whatever comes. «La Troisième», Rome, 1 Nov 1974, Lettres de l'École freudienne no. 16 (1975), p. 184. ‹ Mon S1 n … n’importe quoi›
3. Something produced, not something given. The master's insistence produces the master signifier "out of any signifier whatever". Seminar XVII, session of 18 March 1970. ‹de n’importe quel signifiant … le signifiant-Maître›
4. A relation, in pairs. In the unconscious, signifiers index one another, two by two. Seminar XXII, session of 11 March 1975. ‹ à s’indexer de foisonner … deux par deux›

What Lacan says the Möbius strip is

1. Not something a cut divides. A median cut does not cut the band in two; it turns it into a single band that makes one loop. Seminar XII, session of 16 June 1965. ‹une coupure médiane ne coupe pas … la bande de Mœbius›

2. Nothing but the cut itself. «L'étourdit» (1972), Autres écrits, Seuil 2001, p. 470. ‹la bande de Mœbius n'est rien … cette coupure même› On the same page he describes the edge of that cut: one turn takes it over to the other lamina, a further turn brings it home, having made a "double loop spread over two laminae". ‹double boucle répartie … sur deux lames›

3. Only its edge. The surface can stand for the subject only if you consider that the edge alone constitutes it, and a cut down the middle concentrates "the essence of the double loop". Seminar XIV, session of 15 Feb 1967. ‹seul le bord … cette surface› ‹cette coupure elle-même concentre … de la double boucle›

4. Repetition. The act can only be defined on the basis of the double loop, "that is, of repetition": the act is, in itself, the double loop of the signifier. Same session. ‹sur le fondement de la double boucle … de la répétition› ‹cita 41295: Il est en lui-même … du signifiant›

And what follows: twice, and not the same twice

1. The second time is not the first. A repeated signifier works either as the first time or as the second, with a radical gap between them, and that is what "a signifier cannot signify itself" means. Seminar XIV, session of 23 Nov 1966. ‹le signifiant dans sa présentation répétée … une béance radicale.

2. Two turns. Speaking of the drive and the Möbius band, he says two turns are needed to grasp the division of the subject. Seminar XIII, session of 11 May 1966. ‹cita 39381: il faut faire deux tours pulsionnels … la division du sujet›

If the loop between S1 and S2 meant two signifiers taking turns, Lacan could not coherently:

• call S1 an index and deny that it is the signifier that takes precedence (item 1, 1976);
• say that the master signifier comes out of any signifier whatever (item 3, 1970);
• say that the Möbius strip is nothing but a cut whose edge goes around twice (items 5 and 6, 1965 and 1972);
• say that a repeated signifier is not the same the second time, and that two turns are needed (items 9 and 10, 1966).

Are you following me so far? Now I’m going to complicate things.

Let's put all the pieces together—and voilà!

Nice, right? But what the hell does it mean?

Lacan did not write that down, but by following my method and piecing together his theory, the following conclusion emerges—not in prose format, but as a demonstration with its corresponding theorems.

Lay the chain on a surface and cut along it. If the chain has two sides, the edge of the cut is two copies of it: still odd, still broken. If it has one side (a Möbius band), the edge is a single loop that goes around twice, which is item 6. It meets every signifier once from each side, and it always alternates. For an odd chain, every signifier is S1 on one lap and S2 on the other, necessarily. S1 and S2 are positions (items 1 to 4), and the second time is not the first (item 9).

Lacan doesn't say this, but I draw it as a conclusion.

A) For an odd chain, the loop exists only there.

B) And for an even chain, the Möbius cut divides nothing: each signifier gets the same label on both laps.

"Wait, what happens with the $ubject?"

Okay, you've earned another cute animation.

I answer you radically: the subject is not in the chain. It is at the edge of the cut. And more precisely: it is at the junctions of the edge of the cut—those points where one signifier passes to the next.

On the double loop there is one subject, and it runs around twice. A two-sided cut either doubles the subject or loses it, depending on a decision the theory openly leaves undecided.

The subject is not in the chain of signifiers. It is at the edge of the cut. And in the privileged case—a single side, an odd-numbered chain—there is a single subject that makes two circuits. The division of the subject is not a splitting into two separate substances; it is the repetition of the same circuit, with an internal difference (S1 on the first pass, S2 on the second).

How I did it? Well, I’d have to refer to my text, but in short... Not with prose... I use definitions, six theorems with proofs, and falsifiers, meaning exactly what would refute each result. Plus a small Python script that cuts 159 chains on six surfaces and checks every claim. Full paper, code and animations: Go to zenodo. org and enter this number in the search bar: 23095050

Now, we can raise some objections to my ideas.

At Columbia (1 Dec 1975), Lacan speaks of "a certain S1 and a certain S2, which do not have the same function" (Scilicet 6/7, 1975, pp. 42–45). ‹un certain S1 et un certain S2 … la même fonction› So S1 and S2 would be two different things. Two replies. First, he says function, not signifier, and in the same sentence those functions are distributed "in a certain rotating order": what differs is the place, which is exactly what an index marks. ‹à un certain ordre tournant près … ces quatre fonctions› Second, the double loop keeps the difference. S1 and S2 never fall on the same pass: they differ the way the first turn differs from the second (item 9).

A second objection. Lacan does describe the Möbius strip as having only one face and only one edge (Seminar XII, 13 Jan 1965). ‹seule face … seul bord› True, and it is correct topology. But in the same session as item 5 he warns that the band is only the image of the relation he is after. ‹la bande n’en est … que l’image› Later he says that only the edge counts (item 7) and that the band is the cut itself (item 6). "One side" is a property; the double loop is what he works with.

PS. Seminar XXVII, 15 March 1980, on his own name, the "label Lacan": those who want to erase it believe it is the master signifier, the one he gave index 1, and "they're wrong, it's not the one, it's the other". ‹ils croient que c’est le signifiant maître … c’est l’autre› As I read it, even his name changes index.

I feel like I remember something about Lacan exploring strings and knots (not just the Borromean one) in his later life, but also (and maybe Zizek made this remark in passing) that he could not quite find what he was looking for in this. I also remember footage of Lacan fiddling with a bit of string in his lectures, of this I am more certain.

Am I misremembering things? Are things like the Mobius strip schema and the Borromean knot all there was between Lacan and string/knot topology?

Thanks in advance :)

I'm referring to the Primetime movie about Chris Hansen, but also more broadly about the phenomenon of web series spin-offs featuring vigilante pedo-hunters. These videos usually end in some sort of sadistic bludgeoning of the exposed predator.

I would think Lacan might have an interesting take or two on this. One would think that such vigilantes are decidedly "perverse," ironically, in a structural sense, because by appointing themselves as absolute lawless enforcers for a supposedly broken society, using the premise of protecting the vulnerable to act out their violent enjoyment without institutional mediation. In other words they are "enacting the structural relation to the truth of the Other's desire," i.e. perverse structure, where the truth of the Other's desire (the truth of society's desire) is to just beat the pedos and whatever they represent up, bypassing the courts.

"Lacan is nothing more than a bitter reader of Freud." I’ve heard that a hundred times here and I’m tired of getting downvoted just because I disagree, so today I’m bringing you proof. Here is Lacan addressing this in his own words—and you can look up the quotes yourselves.

Summary: For Lacan, "return to Freud" meant a way of reading Freud. He said outright that it was compatible with calling Freud's texts twisted and his model lame. It never meant signing up to Freud's doctrine.

 What Lacan says the "return" is

 1. Explicitly not a return to the sources, which he says would only be a regression. "D'un dessein", Écrits, p. 366. [FR]

1. A return to the meaning of Freud, not to his doctrine. And that meaning, he says, is that Freud's discovery puts truth itself into question. "La chose freudienne" (Vienna, 7 Nov 1955), Écrits, Seuil 1966, p. 405. [FR]

2. A reversal, aimed at the analytic establishment that inherited Freud's field. Same text, pp. 401–402. [FR]

3. Reading what is actually written, starting with Freud's own claim that the dream is a rebus. Talk at the publisher Kobundo, Tokyo, 21 Apr 1971. [FR]

4. Showing what is cutting in Freud's position, against the Freud the universities had made digestible. Rome press conference, 29 Oct 1974, Lettres de l'École freudienne no. 16 (1975), p. 17. [FR]

5. Bringing analytic practice back to Freud's first topography. He says this is what he meant by the return, because every dream in the Traumdeutung is interpreted by deciphering a verbalized text. "Le phénomène lacanien", Centre universitaire méditerranéen, Nice, 30 Nov 1974. [FR]

What the "return" never stopped him from saying

A) He has just called the Traumdeutung excessively confused and barely readable, and said he put Freud's model of the unconscious "back on its feet". Then he says he spoke of a return to Freud "pour qu'on se convainque d'à quel point c'est boiteux": so that people would be convinced how lame it is. "Ouverture de la Section clinique", 5 Jan 1977, Ornicar? no. 9 (1977), p. 9. [FR]

B) He preached the return and still called Totem and Taboo twisted. No contradiction: the return exists precisely to find out why it's twisted. Seminar XVII, session of 11 March 1970. [FR]

C) "Return to Freud" was a procédé, a device, meant to make analysts notice that what he was telling them was already in Freud. Lecture at the University of Milan, 12 May 1972, in Lacan in Italia 1953–1978, La Salamandra, 1978, p. 43. [FR]

If "return" meant fidelity to Freud's doctrine, Lacan could not coherently:

call it a reversal and deny it's a return to the sources (items 1–3, 1955 and 1966)

say it's compatible with calling Freud's key text twisted (item B, 1970)

call it a device (item C, 1972)

say its purpose was to show how lame Freud's model is (item A, 1977)

He does all four, in his own voice, over 22 years.

What stays constant from 1955 to 1977 is not agreement. It's a way of reading: the meaning, the letter, what cuts. Reading someone closely is not agreeing with them.

The strongest objection: In the Panorama interview (Rome, 21 Nov 1974, with Emilia Granzotto), Lacan says psychoanalysis is Freud, and that one must go by Freud's terms, read literally. Two replies.

First, even at face value, this prescribes a method of reading (item 4), not acceptance of Freud's conclusions. Second, the interview was given in Italian, and the French we have is a translation back from the Italian. An argument built on literal wording is standing on a back-translation.

And in Caracas (12 July 1980), in the same breath as "I am Freudian", he says his three (Real, Symbolic, Imaginary) are not Freud's. Everyone forgets that part.

PD: Milan 1972. Right next to that passage, the transcription contains an odd phrase: "Je m'en fous de toi Freud". I left it out because it may be a transcription error.

https://www.helveticafreak.press/lacan-what-is-the-letter/

I am doing an independent study as part of my PhD program. This entire week's theme of study is Lacan's The Letter -- starting with his "The Instance of the Letter in the Unconscious, or Reason Since
Freud", moving to Fink's both The Lacanian Subject and Reading Ecritis Closely. I added Habermas because I wanted to touch on Frankfurt School. And finally, Zizek's “Why Does a Letter Always Arrive at its Destination? Imaginary, Symbolic, Real.”

I am still not sure if what I've written is completely a right reading, but I have tried to synthesize my thoughts/understandings as best as I could. I would love your thoughts and opinions! Thank you.

I'm working on a project that tries to make Lacan's concepts easier to grasp by walking through them in 3D settings.

The first module is the optical schema, and a browser prototype is now up.

Contents (in French, for now, i may add an english version) :

• Phase 1, Bouasse's experiment.
• Phase 2, Lacan's inversion : The image of the vase comes to "surround them with its neck", which Lacan reads as the image of the body unifying the scattered drives.
• Phase 3, the plane mirror : You stand next to the concave mirror, outside the cone, and can only see the image through the plane mirror, the place of the Other. First you tilt it yourself. Then control is taken away and the mirror is tilted for you, following Lacan's line that "the voice of the other… commands the inclination of the mirror" (Seminar I, 31 March 1954).

Annotations : They follow what you do, at three levels: Discovery (plain language), Reading (Lacan's own meanings) and Text (i(a), i'(a), A, sources). Every quotation was checked against the ALI transcription of the Seminars (I and X), cited with ALI page numbers rather than the Seuil edition. The Remarque sur le rapport de Daniel Lagache is quoted from the ELP transcription.

I'd like to hear from people who know the Seminars well:

• Where does the model oversimplify?
• Does "embodying" the schema help understanding, or does it risk the very imaginary capture it describes?
• Which concept would you want to see next? The mirror stage is planned.

I built it with the help of an AI coding assistant; the reading of the texts and the choices are mine

Hi! I remember reading a book by someone discussing lacan theories and there was a passage that got stuck in my head but can’t find it anywhere.

Basically he was discussing sexual positions and how the feminime side is not all under the phallus. In this context I remeber something along these lines, I apologise if this is very fragmented.

I remember something about how a woman should accept his partner penis as a sign of love, as if it was flowers. Some individuals, predominately women, might get stuck in a position where they demand a sign of love that is impossible for anyone to provide, and therapy can help them reduce this need so she can love and be loved”

This is very butched but i do remember reading something like that and i keep going back to it.

'Because of the historically determined lalinguistic structure of the language it is very difficult to think in Japanese, as you can easily presume that to think in the Finneganian language is practically impossible.

'This difficulty or practical impossibility of thinking in Japanese is conditioning for example some unbelievable characteristics of education in Japan : pupils and students are not encouraged to think by themselves but only to assume what is imposed and dictated to them as absolute norms and traditional standards. If you cannot adapt yourself in that system you will be simply excluded from your local society or from Japanese society as a whole. It is no wonder that Japanese society has been, is and will remain fundamentally totalitarian under its semblance of representative democracy, as well as fundamentally sexist, misogynistic and phallocratic.

'Such impositions of norms have effected and are maintaining the predominance of master significance in the Japanese society. And that predominance of master significance which we must now call paranoiac is in fact the compensation for the impossibility of thinking in Japanese.

'We can say in general that the function of Mehrlust (plus-de-jouir) of the object a and the effect of phallic jouissance of the master signifier S1 in the structure of alienation (cf. figure 3) are competing against each other. We can observe the pure predominance of Mehrlust for example in the sexual perversions while the pure predominance of phallic jouissance is observable in the pure form of paranoia without phenomenon of automatisme mental.

'Most psychoanalytic patients (analysant in French) are neurotics serving two masters simultaneously, that is, dominated by both of the two types of jouissance, Mehrlust of the object a and phallic jouissance of the master signifier S1, functioning side by side and competing against each other.

'We can say in general that you come to psychoanalysis if your phallic jouissance is weak enough and your Mehrlust is not strong enough to compensate the insufficiency of your phallic jouissance, that is, if you are not paranoiac nor pervert.

'And we cannot help having the impression that now in Japan there are so many paranoiacs and so many perverts in the general population...

'What in Japanese prevents one who dwells in that language from having a need or a possibility of experiencing psychoanalysis ? A possible Lacanian answer is : its lalinguistic structure which disfavours a signifier representing for another signifier the subject and which favours the predominance of master significance.

'In actual Japanese society this conditions on one hand the prevalence of nationalistic paranoia, and on the other hand the prevalence of various sexual perversions which are so much various forms of acting out to escape from the suffocating effect of the predominance of master signifier.

'Most of my patients come to psychoanalysis because they are not capable of being sufficiently pervert nor paranoiac in those particularly Japanese ways.

'I only pray that more Japanese people may find the way of psychoanalytic sublimation to escape from those Japanese ways of paranoia and sexual perversions.'

https://ogswrs.blogspot.com/2019/01/why-lacan-says-no-one-who-dwells-in.html?m=1