Article 60 of the charter gives the general assembly and the ecosoc (under the GA's authority) to discharge the functions in chapter 9 including article 55 and given the powers of discussion of the assembly , it seems like the assembly has broad latitude to define human rights within the work of the UN but does this mean that the instruments developed so far such as the UDHR and DRTD are the primary meaning of human rights in the charter ? Which leaves these terms largely undefined

Suppose a state conducts a military operation that disrupts an international shipping route, and import-dependent countries face higher food and energy costs. Assume the conduct is attributable to the state and breaches an international obligation owed to a third state. The question here is which economic losses could be recoverable, not whether rising prices alone establish a violation.

Article 2 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility covers attribution and breach, and Article 31 requires full reparation for the “injury caused by” the wrongful act. Establishing the breach doesn’t answer how closely the conduct must be connected to the losses claimed.

Market effects make that hard to assess. Shipping disruption can raise freight and insurance costs, but the final price of imported goods also reflects exchange rates, suppliers’ decisions, domestic policies and other disruptions happening at the same time.

The commentary to Article 31, paragraph 10, says the causal link required “is not necessarily the same in relation to every breach of an international obligation,” so the approach to causation and remoteness can depend on the obligation breached and the interests it protects. On that reading, not every later loss is recoverable, but transmission through markets would not by itself exclude a loss from reparation.

There’s also a difference between extra expenditure by a government and losses suffered by private importers or households. Who suffered the injury, and on what legal basis a state could seek reparation for it, matter as much as causation. Jurisdiction is a separate hurdle.

How should causation and remoteness be assessed when economic losses in a third state are transmitted through markets and have several contributing causes?

Quoting article 2(1)

> Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.

Does this imply that states which can afford to do so must have a universal healthcare system ?

Edit; is progressive realisation a measurable obligation ? And can things such as improving the economy to be able to afford those rights count as part of the obligation ?

• Sergey Vasiliev is Professor of International Law at Open University of the Netherlands.

• Triestino Mariniello is Professor of Law at Liverpool John Moores University in the UK. He is also Member of the Legal Team representing Gaza victims before the ICC.

From the general comments that I've read , the term seems to denote the classic meaning of "other" which means grounds identical to the explicitly mentioned ones , a lot of these have immutable nature while some of them like religion and opinion are not but is this likely to apply to every ground if human rights principles of universality are applied ?

Former UN Special Rapporteur on the occupied Palestinian territories, Michael Lynk, breaks down the 4 major international legal proceedings on Israel and Palestine at the ICJ and ICC. He describes how they are being used both to advance Palestinian rights and to prevent the erosion of international law, which he says is being shredded by Israel and the United States. This provides insight into why the US is sanctioning the courts.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dJa3GcsFRYg

Contestation is when member states frustrate the functioning of an IO such as through non participation in a quorum or refusal to provide necessary immunities and physical presence to perform their purposes and functions. Is other than peace and security problems , this legal ?

In particular in UN where it has a broad list of purposes in article 1(2) and 1(3)

I'm a member of a vulnerable community in my country and for a long period of time I depended on UN to continue and strengthen dialogue with my country on this issue because the civil society organizations In this place do not have the necessary support and are often targets by government. But recently I've felt extremely hopeless after finding out various things a state possibly can do such as the things I mentioned.

Assuming that the above mentioned things are considered legal , is this issue set in a stone in the sense that the strongest possible interpetation in their favor prevails without counter arguments ? I would be truly lying if I said i don't have a vested interest in this topic.

I emailed Robert Kolb on if good faith can prevent contestation within organs and he said

That could be, but I would not say that it is. In practice, States have always used the policy of the empty chair for diplomatic reasons. Thus, good faith obligations could hardly have hardened around such a policy. In other words, a contrary practice can expel certain potential candidates from the circle of good faith. In short, I would not give a positive answer to this limb.

This is possibly the final time I'm asking this , I know I've been persistent.

The Expert Panel unanimously found that the Accused has the capacity to understand the charges, understand the purpose and consequences of the proceedings, follow the course of the proceedings, including the nature and implications of entering a plea, understand the evidence, and instruct counsel in the preparation and conduct of his defence. 

I got an assignment. I was supposed to figure our an incident and i selected the incident of US torpedoed Iran IRIS dena. But now i have question because US is not on any treaties, does not accept compulsory jurisdiction or any other possible jurisdictional basis under ARTICLE 36 of the ICJ STATUTE. Can you guys explain it to me briefly what and how i should argue for the question of " Can Iran constitute proceedings against USA before the ICJ?"

Any help is much appreciated.

Hi everyone,

​I’m looking for honest feedback from alumni or past participants of The Hague Academy Summer Courses (Public/Private International Law).

​I’m currently a 4th-year law student in an EU dual-degree program focusing on international economic law. I’m considering applying for the upcoming Summer Courses as a full-fee attendee, but considering total costs (tuition + 3 weeks accommodation/living expenses in The Hague coming to around €2,500–€3,000), I’m debating whether to go now or wait 1–2 years until I finish my Master’s degree.

​Since Directed Studies and scholarships require a completed Master’s degree at application time, going now means I’d attend strictly as a general attendee (Certificate of Attendance) in the plenary hall.

​A few specific questions for those who have attended:

​CV Value: How is the Certificate of Attendance perceived in practice for internships, competitive Master’s programs, or international firms? Is it genuinely valued, or is it mostly seen as "paid attendance"?

​Networking & Experience: Does attending as a general participant still provide meaningful networking and access to professors/the Peace Palace Library, or are the ~300+ attendees too diluted compared to the small Directed Studies cohorts?

​Timing: In hindsight, would you recommend waiting until completing a Master’s degree to be eligible for the scholarship and the Directed Studies / Diploma exam, or is attending early as an undergrad/M1 student still a solid investment?

​Thanks a lot for any candid insights!

​

Listening to people talk about Israel-Palestine and whether it's a genocide, I'm usually hearing people recite the ICC Rome Statute's description of genocide (killing members, causing mental/physical harm, creating conditions for the group calculated to bring destruction, preventing births, forcibly transferring children).

The description doesn't provide any more elaboration on what these points mean more specifically. I'd really love to know what "or in part" means since that could apply to just doing so to any single person. There's no clear separation, IMHO, between a genocide against an entire group of people or a hate crime against one individual.

It also doesn't specify whether these five items are to define genocide if all are applied or if any are applied. The recent UN fact-finding commission used the interpretation of any being applied such that evidence for any of the five items would be sufficient evidence to conclude it's a genocide.

They also seemed to take the stance that "in part" can mean any single instance regardless of intention, public/authoritative incitement or scope. An example would be the destruction of the fertility clinic and the embryos inside. While shocking and sad, it confused me to hear that that alone could constitute a genocide as a single incident without wider directive from those commanding the units involved.

At this point, I think interpretations of the statute are used to re-interpret the meaning of the word genocide.

If I were to exclude the first definitional item (killing) and ignore the "in part" part, this would seem to be the definition of ethnic cleansing. I've only considered the commonly-used, etymologically-relevant meaning of genocide to be just (an attempt towards) killing an entire group of people.

I believe some of the finer points of interpretation may need to rely on how they played out in actual case law, but maybe I'm wrong. Either way, I could really use some extra perspective on this.

> 184. The Court recalls that, as a general rule, the way in which a subsidiary organ established by the General Assembly is utilized depends on the consent of the State or States concerned (Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 165), and that States “possess a sovereign power of decision with respect to their acceptance of the headquarters or a regional office of an organization within their territories” 57 - (Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1980, p. 89, para. 37). It follows that, within the territory of Israel, the presence and activities of the United Nations and its entities are subject to the consent of Israel. However, in the occupied territory, over which Israel, as an occupying Power, enjoys no sovereignty, it is not entitled to decide unilaterally, with respect to the presence and activities of the United Nations in and in relation to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, in the same way as in its own territory.

This seems to largely imply that Member States can unilaterally withdraw or decline all UN presence and activity, yet there is no provision in the Charter concerning a State's ability to rescind UN presence in the same way that the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations provides for the termination of diplomatic relations.

It doesn't make sense that there would be provisions in the Charter concerning privileges and immunities but that these could effectively be withdrawn or denied simply by refusing UN presence. The U.S. Headquarters Agreement at least provides for the non-removal of the seat, but still, how is the term “enjoy such privileges and immunities” not something to be interpreted as being given maximum effect to ?

The WHO ruling, in particular, that there is no right to establish a headquarters or regional office, seems very debilitating. Is this level of paralysis really permissible?

It does seem like a lot of subsidiary bodies of general assembly require state consent to operate like the UN country teams so this would be a possible interpretation but this seems like a substantial level of paralysis

There's a lot of vagueness in both articles

First is the fact that article 55 claims that the goals in the sub sections of the article are means to peaceful and friendly relations of states. However the language used in the universal declaration of human rights treats human rights as based on "inherent dignity" of the individual as opposed to only the post WW2 formulation which I assume is based on the preamble of the charter.

Second is article 56 which speaks of a pledge to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the organization for the achievement of the goals mentioned in article 55. But there's no enforcement mechanism and the term "cooperation" is very broad and doesn't seem to be capable of formulating specific obligations. Is article 56 even legally binding ?

The commentary on UN charter by Professor simma seems to imply that the obligation even if it exists is narrow in scope.

​

The ILC guidelines on treaty reservations state that a state would remain a party to the treaty unless an objection is made to a late reservation. But what if the reservation is late and also impermissible ? Because the guidelines say that if a state party makes an impermissible reservation then they remain a party but there's a rebuttable presumption that they intended to be part of the treaty without the reservation unless a contrary intention is established

So if a state party makes a late reservation to a treaty but that same reservation is also impermissible and they express that they do not want remain part of a treaty without the reservation, can they be absolved of being part of a treaty this way ?

it doesn't make sense that a late reservation if objected to can continue the treaty without the benefit of reservation but somehow a late impermissible reservation can give states the option to express contrary intent and be absolved of the treaty but I haven't found anything contrary to this possibility which is very concerning because it exposes a possible loophole

Why can't an impermissible late reservation automatically be void without needing objection and also have the state party required to be continuing to be a party of the treaty ?

https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft_articles/1_8_2011.pdf

Edit; is the guidelines customary law codification or progressive development of IL and particularly in regards to human rights treaties , does General comment 24 which proposes a strict severability doctrine still stand ?

I'm an Indian citizen(not a law student or practitioner), so the India-Pakistan dispute over the Indus Waters Treaty is what first got me looking into this. But after reading about the Kishenganga and Ratle proceedings, I got more interested in the actual treaty provisions and how the two dispute-resolution mechanisms are supposed to work.

I'm not asking this to argue that India is right or Pakistan is right. I'm trying to understand the treaty itself, and I'd genuinely like to know if I'm missing something.

The part I'm looking at is the relationship between the Neutral Expert under Annexure F and the Court of Arbitration under Annexure G.

The basic timeline

19 August 2016: Pakistan initiated arbitration concerning the Kishenganga and Ratle projects.

4 October 2016: India requested the appointment of a Neutral Expert concerning the same projects.

December 2016: The World Bank paused both processes because of concerns about conflicting outcomes.

2022: The World Bank announced that the processes would resume.

6 July 2023: The Court of Arbitration issued its Award on Competence and held that it had competence to hear the case. India did not participate in the arbitration.

7 January 2025: The Neutral Expert issued his decision on his competence.

Both processes have since continued.

What I'm trying to understand

The Treaty makes a distinction between a "difference" and a "dispute."

Article IX(2)(a) provides for a Neutral Expert where a difference falls within Part 1 of Annexure F.

Article IX(2)(b) deals with matters outside that category, and also with a situation where the Neutral Expert decides that a difference, or part of it, should be treated as a dispute.

Then there is Annexure F paragraph 7, which deals with what happens when the Commissioners disagree about whether a particular difference falls within the Neutral Expert's competence.

At the same time, Annexure G paragraph 16 gives the Court of Arbitration the power to decide questions relating to its own competence.

This is where I'm getting stuck.

Article IX(6)

Article IX(6) says:

«"The provisions of paragraphs (3), (4) and (5) shall not apply to any difference while it is being dealt with by a Neutral Expert."»

Paragraphs (3), (4) and (5) are the provisions leading towards arbitration.

What I don't see is an obvious "first filing wins" provision.

The Treaty doesn't appear to say that whoever starts proceedings first automatically gets exclusive jurisdiction.

But it also doesn't expressly say that a later Neutral Expert request can displace an arbitration that has already started.

How I currently see it

Maybe I'm looking at this too simply, but it seems to me that both sides have some textual foundation in the Treaty.

The Court of Arbitration has a treaty basis for its competence, particularly under the arbitration provisions and Annexure G.

At the same time, India clearly has a treaty basis for requesting a Neutral Expert. The Neutral Expert mechanism wasn't something created outside the Treaty; it is expressly provided for in Article IX and Annexure F.

And I can see problems with both sides' arguments.

If Pakistan's position is essentially that starting arbitration first settles the matter, then I'm not sure where the Treaty actually says "first filing wins."

But if India's position is that a later Neutral Expert request can override an arbitration that has already been initiated, I also don't see an obvious provision saying that either.

This is why I'm having trouble with the issue.

If the Treaty deliberately created a Neutral Expert mechanism for certain technical questions, can the fact that one party filed for arbitration first effectively make that part of the Treaty unavailable in a particular case?

If the answer is yes, what is the actual treaty provision that produces that result?

And if the answer is no, how does the Court's interpretation deal with the fact that the Treaty itself specifically created the Neutral Expert mechanism?

It appears to be the case that ILC has often used essentially the same methodology for both codification as well as progressive development of international law, making it difficult to determine when the Commission is describing existing law and when it is proposing what the law should become.

https://academic.oup.com/ejil/article/33/3/761/6770700

Particularly in the 2011 guidelines on treaty reservations, it seems to appear that ILC developed the solution to the severability/consensuslism problem of invalid treaty reservations rather than codify existing state practice on it while formulating the solution as a legal obligation.

In the UN charter 1(2). Equal rights is a second principle in addition to self determination that is to be respected but what does it mean ? Does it mean all "peoples" have the same status and rights ? Even people without a state ?

A comprehensive 1200-page report by Amnesty International on the human rights abuses and killings.

I’m looking for views from people familiar with international nationality law.

Article 15(2) of the UDHR recognizes that everyone has the right to change their nationality. At the same time, the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness generally prevents a person from renouncing nationality if this would leave them stateless.

This seems to create a practical gap: what happens when a person genuinely wants to voluntarily terminate their current nationality, but has not yet obtained — and cannot yet obtain — another nationality?

I’m exploring a proposal for an international transitional citizenship status: a person could voluntarily leave their existing nationality without becoming stateless, receive an internationally recognized identity/travel document and legal status, and later acquire the permanent nationality of a state.

The proposal would not be intended to replace the existing international protection against statelessness or override states’ sovereignty over immigration and naturalization.

I’ve put the broader proposal into a petition here:

https://www.change.org/transitional_citizenship

My main question for this community is the legal one: is there an existing mechanism in international law that could already address this situation, or would such a status necessarily require a new international legal instrument and state agreement?

I’d particularly appreciate criticism of the concept from an international-law perspective.