Published by: Joe Weisenthal (Bloomberg)
Link: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/newsletters/2026-10-01/what-a-weird-market-looks-like?srnd=phx-oddlots
Inflation and interest rates always bounce around with the business cycle and other random factors. However it’s long seemed obvious to me that these measures are deeply related to domestic politics in any given country. Think of the countries that have had incredibly low rates (Switzerland, Japan, etc.), and what they have in common is a high degree of domestic stability. Then think of the countries that famously have really high inflation. Your Zimbabwes, your Argentinas, your Turkeys, and so on, and the various forms of domestic dysfunction they’ve experienced. And, as a general rule, when countries go to war (one of the ultimate manifestations of dysfunction) inflation tends to go up.
I’ve never found the popular saying that “inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon” all that convincing. Inflation, at its core, is a political one. To the extent a country is lucky enough to have a central bank that can really dial in and control inflation, it’s because that country has a political environment that is capable of allocating monetary authority to some independent entity not controlled by a king or a president or by the public directly.
Yesterday in the newsletter, I wrote briefly about surging bond yields in France (which I’ll get back to in a second) and it made me think back to the euro crisis. In the early 2010s, the Eurozone tried to come up with an arrangement to bail out countries suffering from a run on their sovereign debt. The deal was basically this: You got a bailout, but then in exchange, you had to let the ECB, the European Commission, and the IMF (the so-called “Troika”) come in and dictate your economic affairs. Sovereign bond investors didn’t trust local elected politicians to pay back their debts unless some more serious institutions were brought in from the outside to run the show. If you recall, one of the catalysts for the Greek sovereign debt crisis was an accusation that the country had published false economic data, which is the kind of thing that blows a government’s credibility to shreds among investors, since that’s a classic symptom of political dysfunction. Another catalyst for the crisis was Angela Merkel saying that EU member states had to be responsible for their own bank bailouts, which made investors question whether the political trend of deeper and deeper European integration had hit a wall or would go in reverse.
So, surging borrowing costs in peripheral Europe during the early 2010s weren’t really about debt loads, they were about a lack of confidence in domestic political leaders, and specifically whether the domestic political leaders would have the impulse and political capital (two sides of the same coin, really) to make difficult spending decisions that would prioritize bondholders getting repaid.
Let’s turn back to France in 2026. One thing I hadn’t realized until after wrapping up yesterday’s newsletter is that France actually pays more to borrow than Italy. Up until late last year, since the history of the euro’s formation, Italy had always paid more to borrow than France. But now France is looking at a presidential election next year, where the two leading candidates are from the “far right” and “far left” parties, and investors don’t like what they see on the horizon.
This brings us to the US. When we talk about the drivers of inflation, and higher rates right now, the story is that there is all of this AI spending, there are unfavorable demographics (booming entitlement spending), and also the war in Iran. But of course, policy could do a lot here. Continuing the war is a decision. It’s also a policy choice to refrain from cutting domestic spending and/or raising taxes on wealth and consumption. It’s a policy choice to not reform the healthcare system and reduce costs. We don’t have a national political situation that is amenable to raising taxes or cutting spending or reforming huge sectors of the economy. Spending continues to boom, and the market expects more rate hikes from the Fed to keep inflation in check. And that’s how you wind up with higher and higher yields across the curve.
If we were to have some election, where politicians had a broad mandate to do serious fiscal tightening, you would expect inflation (and then rates) to come down. But literally nobody expects that. It’s unimaginable. So sustained, increasing deficits are talked about as if they are some immovable structural force, rather than a policy choice.