I'm not sure if this is an actual philosophy perse, but I have a framework that makes me uncomfortable and was hoping to see a criticism of it simply because it'll make me feel better. I know that's kind of primitive but oh well.

The framework assumes reality is eternal, lacks emergents, and is ultimately idealistic.

What we call a sequence, and a determination, doesn't actually exist. Let's talk about conscious awareness. If I think of white, my mind simply becomes white. I then think of black and my mind suddenly becomes black. Now, how do I know there was an object in mind distinct from black, also known as white? Do I think about white? Well sure, let's do just that. So now I think about white, but hold on, where did black go? Did black even exist?

P1 Our awareness exists only in the present.

P2 It can select only one element due to LNC.

P3 Therefore, what we call the past is simply an element in the present, as our awareness can only consist of the present, our past thought is only in the present.

P4 Because the past is simply the present, and every present thought is "replaced", our next present thought does not allow us to conceive of a "past" thought without making that "past" thought our present.

C1 And so how can sequence occur if there is only the present, and every element in the past removes the next, making us skeptical of if there was a past thought at all prior to it, as only the present exists. Say for instance I thought of red, and I think "after" blue. To know I thought of red, I must replace blue for red, but this would simply tell me it is a present thought, because blue isn't in the mix of its relations to red.

C2 So our present thought, as it can only select one element, it can not conceive of relations, and therefore only a single element, and therefore not conceive of a past thought or distinction, if there is no relation to conceive of.

One may direct themselves to the notion of wholes which implies logical priority and therefore sequence, but I'm hesitant to affirm if a whole exists.

One may consequently conclude that a whole should exist if what we call a material "part" is ultimately divisible, yet, how do we know we aren't conceiving of something indivisible? If our mind can only be concentrated on one element, wouldn't it follow that it's not able to conceive of a determined element and only a simple one?

The only argument against this is that if a whole doesn't exist, then nothing can be divisible, which means it has no shape, size, mass, and so on; therefore it's value is 0, and cannot be conceived of.

However, my rather slow brain is yet to process this as a sufficient answer for some reason. I'm hesitant and I'm not sure why.

Additionally, even if we understand that everything we conceive of is a composite, how can we figure out what it's parts are that make it a composite, if our minds can only be unitarily selective in its awareness? We first view the whole, and then the parts, but what tells us we are viewing the parts to that whole? This seems even stranger if the whole precedes the parts.

This is a case for Monism, but as I said, I find this philosophy to be extremely uncomfortable. Why do anything? Why feel anything? Why not just yk, end it a-? Essentially, it feels extremely bleak and boring. I honestly hate it a lot!

So I was hoping for a case of proving that we cannot conceive of a simple substance, and our awareness is attached to wholes, therefore wholes exist, and on a side note, are priori to parts.

EDIT: I meant Monism. Also, to sort some things out as I am referring to some different concepts. We start with awareness, sequence, constitutes, composites, and so fourth.

I started off with the fact that I'm operating on an idealistic framework, so my awareness of what we call change isn't synchronous to how reality necessarily operates.

The issue we are primarily dealing with is sequence. To be sequential, is to have constitutes that include priority. To be a constitute that's distinct from the other, you must be a composite as well. To me, these concepts are extremely deeply connected.

Avicenna proposes that the soul is stuck in a loop of bodily desires and a desire to leave it and ascend, whilst not being able to ascend. And this is a natural consequence of the soul as it's detached from the body.

This is a rather gloomy and tragic end in my opinion. As someone who relies on a lot of his philosophy, it's a bit disheartening hearing this.

But I'd like to know if there are neoplatonic alternatives that operate within his framework and criticize the conclusion he arrived at regarding Hades being a permanent state of affair for the soul.

Plato wasn’t a Platonist, he was a Pythagorean.

The triangle is a Pythagorean triplet with side lengths 3, 4, and 5.

The corresponding incircle and excircles have radii 1, 2, 3, and 6. Completing the sequence 123456.

The circles represent the four virtues, the largest representing justice.

When wisdom, courage, and moderation are in harmony justice is achieved, that’s why all three circles can fit inside the largest.

Is there a reason why people often seem inclined to do bad things despite knowing they’re bad? I’m thinking specifically of Augustine’s doctrine of Concupiscence. Augustine seems to suggest that the inclination to do wrong has a more positive basis than mere ignorance of the good and I’m wondering if there is a Neoplatonic analogue or answer to this

Divisions of the soul? Nous? ''Rational soul''? ''Non rational soul''? ''Highest and most intellectual'' part of the soul? ''Highest part of the soul''? ''Vegetative soul''?

What are these and how do they relate to eachother? Im trying to get a full picture. For context im getting into Platonism and neoplatonism and have started reading the commentary of Olympiodorus on Alcibiades.

I've been reading On The Mysteries by Iamblichus, and honestly some of it is very confusing to me. So I was hoping I could get some answers here to some of my questions.

The text says:

According to another division, therefore, the numerous herd [or the great mass] of men is arranged under nature, is governed by physical powers, looks downward to the works of nature, gives completion to the administration of Fate, and to things pertaining to Fate, because it belongs to the order of it, and always employs practical reasoning about such particulars alone as subsist according to nature. But there are a certain few who, by employing a certain supernatural power of intellect, are removed indeed from nature, but are conducted to a separate and unmingled intellect; and these, at the same time, become superior to physical powers. Others again, who are the media between these, tend to things which subsist between nature and a pure intellect. And of these, some indeed equally follow both nature and an immaculate intellect; others embrace a life which is mingled from both; and others are liberated from things subordinate, and betake themselves to such as are more excellent.

This division, therefore, being made, that which follows will most manifestly take place. For those who are governed by the nature of the universe, who lived conformably to this, and employ the powers of nature, these should embrace a mode of worship adapted to nature, and to the bodies that are moved by nature, and should choose for this purpose appropriate places, air, matter, the powers of matter, bodies, and the habits of bodies, qualities, and proper motions, the mutations of things in generation, and other things connected with these, both in other parts of piety and in that part of it which pertains to sacrifice. But those who live conformably to intellect alone, and to the life of intellect, and are liberated from the bonds of nature, these should exercise in all the parts of theurgy the intellectual and incorporeal mode of worship. And those who are the media between these, should labour differently in the paths of piety, conformably to the differences of this middle condition of life, either by embracing both modes of piety, or separating themselves from one of the modes [and adhering to the other], or receiving both these modes as the foundation of things of a more honourable nature. For without these they never can arrive at things supereminent. Or, in some other way, they should thus, in a becoming manner, labour in the paths of sanctity.

My interpretation of this chapter is the following: The great mass of humanity is stuck in materiality, and should therefore worship the gods via material rites. Those free from materiality, who live the life of intellect, should worship the gods via incorporeal rites. And those in the middle should practice both, or perform one and drop the other.

To me this seems to create a higher vs lower division within theurgy. The great mass of humanity should engage in material worship, while those who have advanced and are at a higher level should only engage in incorporeal rites since it says they should engage "in all the parts of theurgy the intellectual and incorporeal mode of worship".

Is this a correct reading of the text? Would those in the middle or at the highest level no longer practice the material rites that the "great mass of humanity" engages in? Would they no longer make offerings of food, incense, etc. to the gods, or engage in public sacrifices or offerings? Or is there a difference between these rites and theurgical rites?

I feel like my interpretation is incorrect because such rites were fundamental to the Greek/Roman religion.

Or Michael Della Rocca for a more modern defender.

When I look out the window, I can't take seriously the idea that we live in undifferentiated, unchanging being. The question is more, can we apply a similarly strict rationalism, since I don't want to ever inhibit on the PSR. It seems that the rejection of relation, the so called Bradley's Regress, is a version of the Third Man argument. Relations must be real, but why are they the way they are? Della Rocca takes these issues to violate the PSR and therefore lead us to Parmenidesianism. William Vallicella would try to solve the problem by the unifier of a being and their relations to be a contingent, free act of God. But what would other Neoplatonists, ancient and modern, write?

I'm sorry for the confusing paragraph, I'm presupposing that the reader will understand the positions I'm talking about. An explanation of the books and theories take absurdly long.

E: Also, the reason why this question is interesting to me: I accept the ultimate intelligibility of reality and take this to be the only rational position to be. While fringe and comparatively a position that could be in tension with everyday experience, this or similar views (e.g. the idealism of Bernardo Kastrup and his Essentia Foundation) are the most serious competitor to Neoplatonism. A fruitful engagement with their philosophy, since they also strictly adhere to intelligibility, will reveal areas where defense of the metaphysics is most valuable.

I have seen that Kabbalah Jews and Ismalili Muslims has adopted the idea of emination from neoplatonism, but the probelm both Tanakh and Quran reject Monism and insist that God and his creation are separated, this makes me wonder how does non-monist eminationism work? My assumption is that the substance of God and his overflow are different, but that feel it kills purpose of eminationism.

I understand why a qualified maximization of division is privatory, and division is parasitic to unity however, what I dont understand is why can't our nature be towards a certain level of hatred that has a level of positive substance, and the maximization of it isn't qualitative, but quantative.

If it's the latter, it never leads to privation, and a perfection is still fulfilled.

Like I understand how unity is ontologically superior and is an intellectual form of hatred, so hatred is derivative, but I don't understand why our nature ought to include a higher ontological source rather than a lower one.

For example... Say all humans wind up in the same degree of extreme pain somehow. This pain isn't there to reprimand, but it's there to bring unity. I don't understand how this is any different from two souls sharing love between each other, if what's good is based off how unified one is.

My body is a temple of the Source

The world contains its animating force

Behind the natures of all things

Behind the four causes of a thing:

Form, matter, cause, goal,

Let me demonstrate this whole

Take the shape of a tree

The wood and leaves of a tree

The planter of the seed of the tree

The goal of the growth of the tree

And this goes back to the animating force

And that goes back to the Source

As I mediate on this beauty 

and on the beauty of virtuous activity

And seek to practice it in my life

by seeking to avoid excess and strife

I ascend back to the Source

And become one with the animating force.

A man from India, a man from Nepal,

A man from Nazareth born of a virgin,

All were animated by the animating force,

Straight from the Source,

All to preach virtue.

The man from India counseled a Prince

Helping him follow his destiny into battle.

The Man from Nepal was a Prince

Who left it all for a life of Enlightenment.

And the Man from Nazareth born of a virgin

was crucified and rose again and ascended.

And that is what makes Him so special. 

Because we all have the Source.

But we must awaken to it.

Do you believe Plato’s republic is primarily literal, allegorical, or both?

Also, I'm a bit confused on the difference between nous in platonic thought and the Stoic Logos

I'm having trouble being able to even sensationalize unity in it of itself. I know it can't be analyzed perse, but how do we find ourselves to be aware of unity? An example that helped me was two shades of the same color. There is a sensation of similarity that is grasped immediately, but at the same time, it can be analyzed as physical wave lengths, showing us the similarity at an analytical level.

As an American, I'm in some ways culturally downstream from Platonism and Neoplatonism. But I feel that when I read something like the Wikipedia article "Plotinus" I'm reaching across a cultural gap that is so extremely wide that much of the philosophical content sounds like gibberish from this distance.

I'm trying to approach this from the assumption that Neoplatonism, whether true or not, has at least been extremely persuasive to some very sharp minds. I suspect that it must not be quite as arbitrary as it seems at first glance.

There's a Monad, and emanations, and some kind of creative process by which the material world comes from a series of emanations from some kind of unchangeable onness ... I recognize the overall structure to some degree from Christian theology and Jewish mysticism, which have at least some analogous ideas. But I'm still not sure what I'm looking at when I bump into it.

If I want to get as close as possible to an inside view of what Neoplatonists believed, and especially of *why* they believed it, what do I need to know? Book recommendations would be especially appreciated.

I've tried reading some books on Platonism (which I am having a hard time tracking down now) but have had a hard time continuing interest in them since they were overtly abstract or academic perhaps. I feel like through the influence of Julian of Norwich, Meister Eckhardt, Dionysius the Areopagite, Gaudiya Vaishnavism, Dzogchen and Trika Saivism I might have arrived at the same conclusions if that is possible.

Basically I believe there is one ultimate, unchangeable reality that is Consciousness/God. Everything is real, but the material world is subject to change and dependent origination/conditionality. Our life here though is not a mistake, it is an intentional choice of God to live as conditioned beings as "play" to experience curiosity, growth, enjoyment, etc. Our problem is though misidentifying ourselves, the eternal and unlimited truth, with the conditioned, limited, and temporary world.And thus experiencing fear, attachment, etc. And there are many emanations of the higher reality that come to remind us to help us remember what we actually are (such as the Logos of God/Christ, or the Mahayana interpretation of the Buddha Tathagata not as the "one gone to suchness" but as the "one come from ultimate reality").

Edit to add more details: I would say the main spiritual practice is silent meditation, remembering not to limit God to my conceptions and knowing God goes infinitely beyond what I can conceive. The next is remembering I am not my material body, to not get too drawn up into what is happening. It is just an experience, and even if bad has no ability to endanger the true core of my being. And then third and kind of related is remembering because everything is unified in having one original cause and source, the potentiality of everything is found in every thing. All of the future is dependent on every single tiny thing, and every single detail of the past created what is now. Everything is part of one unified reality that could not be different (basically Indra's net from Buddhism).

I believe the world is an emanation of God and that God grounds our very being and our purpose is to realize our non-dual union with God. I believe God’s mind as well as our minds contains abstract universals but in the physical world universals are particularized in the objects themselves as the natures of the objects. I also believe the purpose of ethics is to support the dignity and flourishing of the human. Which is why I criticize our mechanizing culture. BTW I’m also Catholic.

Plato wasn’t a Platonist, he was a Pythagorean.

The triangle is a Pythagorean triplet with side lengths 3, 4, and 5.

The corresponding incircle and excircles have radii 1, 2, 3, and 6. Completing the sequence 123456.

The circles represent the four virtues, the largest representing justice.

When wisdom, courage, and moderation are in harmony justice is achieved, that’s why all three circles can fit inside the largest.

Hope you all like it.

Does anyone have and book suggestions or where to find more information on Apollo Oulios?

Specifically the healing and sometimes darker sides of Apollo.

I have a problem with Iamblichus that I keep coming back to, and it concerns his hierarchy of divine beings.

His system gives us something along the lines of gods → archangels → angels → daimons → heroes → souls, with the higher beings progressively mediating divine activity toward the lower levels. More importantly, the same divine seira can apparently extend through these different levels: Zeus can be considered as god, as archangel, as angel, and as daimon, without these being simply identical entities.

I am aware that both Iamblichus and Proclus turn to exegesis to make traditional mythology compatible with this kind of theology. The myths can be read as describing the entire seira of a god rather than simply the highest god himself. So an apparently anthropomorphic action of Zeus can be interpreted as referring to some lower manifestation or intermediary within Zeus's seira.

But this is precisely what I find problematic.

That is not an immediate or particularly easy way of understanding Homer or Hesiod. Homer does not say that Zeus appears sometimes as a god, sometimes as an archangel, sometimes as an angel, and sometimes as a daimon. Hesiod doesn't either. The Zeus we encounter in the poetry is simply Zeus: he moves, speaks, desires, becomes angry, intervenes, fights, has relationships and acts within the world.

So if the theology requires us to reinterpret every anthropomorphic or localized action as belonging to some lower member of the god's seira, we are already several interpretive steps removed from the actual phenomenology of the myth.

And this is where I find Iamblichus especially difficult. His description of divine beings as luminous, stable, immaterial and essentially unlike mobile anthropomorphic beings is not something I can easily locate in the surviving mythological sources.

Even Babylonian material, which initially seems to fit his hierarchical model better because it has such a rich hierarchy of gods, subordinate divine beings and spirits, doesn't really solve the problem. Marduk can occupy an extremely high cosmological position and still behave anthropomorphically in the Enūma Eliš. He speaks, moves, fights, receives weapons and makes decisions. The highest god is still presented phenomenologically as a divine person.

This makes me wonder whether Iamblichus's phenomenology makes more sense against a body of theological literature that we have largely lost, perhaps particularly the theological tradition surrounding the Chaldean Oracles and their lost commentaries. If those texts contained a developed mythological account of the different levels of a divine seira, then Iamblichus's system may have been much more immediately intelligible to his intended audience than it is to us.

Without that material, however, I find his hierarchy difficult to use as a straightforward taxonomy of traditional religion. It is philosophically sophisticated, but it doesn't seem to correspond to the way the surviving myths actually present their gods.

This also makes me wonder about Proclus.

I know that Proclus likewise uses allegorical and exegetical methods to interpret myths as revealing different levels of a god's seira. But his distinction between hypercosmic, encosmic and sublunary gods seems potentially easier to reconcile with traditional Greek religion. At least it allows one to retain a recognizable landscape of gods and daimons, rather than requiring something like:

Zeus as god → Zeus as archangel → Zeus as angel → Zeus as daimon.

That latter structure may be philosophically coherent, but it is not something recorded in Homer or Hesiod, nor does it strike me as a particularly natural or immediate way of reading them.

So I am wondering whether Proclus actually provides a more readable philosophical theology for someone starting from traditional Greek religion, despite his metaphysics being, if anything, even more elaborate than Iamblichus's.