A threat intelligence researcher (@TheM3gatr0n) found an active, custom-built attack platform called Cairn on a Hong Kong-registered VPS. It is not a simple script or toolkit — it is a full autonomous orchestration system driven by an LLM (DeepSeek v4.1-flash).
The operator supplies a target and a goal (e.g., obtain a webshell or RCE). The AI then handles the rest: it spins up a dedicated Kali Linux Docker container per victim, reviews a fact-graph of prior attempts, selects the next action, executes it, records the outcome, and continues across sessions with almost no human involvement.
Over roughly 13 days it logged ~230,000 AI-dispatched events and ~18,000 active exploitation attempts against 85+ targets. It heavily focused on Magento/e-commerce systems and demonstrated adaptive behavior by tracking failures and writing structured summaries of what worked or was blocked. Access to the model was maintained via a subscription rotation service.
This is one of the clearer public examples of an LLM being used for real, ongoing autonomous offensive operations rather than one-off experiments.

https://x.com/them3gatr0n/status/2110406318976848132?s=46&t=oXrX4_YhCRl53cYhwA-HsA

Backups answer "can we restore?" They do not answer "should we restore now?"

In a large environment, the difficult part is deciding whether the initial access path is closed, privileged identities have been contained, recovery infrastructure is trustworthy, and restored systems will not immediately reconnect to affected dependencies.

You never get perfect certainty. At some point, the business has to choose between more downtime and a higher chance of restoring into an unsafe state.

What evidence do you require before reconnecting a restored system to production?

been looking into Sygnia and Kroll for incident response but haven't found much feedback from people who have actually worked with them.

mostly curious about response times how they handle incidents and whether they are worth the cost

anyone here used Sygnia? would appreciate anyy feedback

Started with a phishing report. A user clicked through a consent prompt for a "PDF converter" and granted it Mail.Read. We revoked it, fine, and then I made the mistake of looking at the rest.

Dumped every delegated grant with Graph PowerShell and filtered for Mail. 61 apps. Some obvious ones like the CRM integration and the e-signature tool. Then a scheduling app nobody admits to using, two AI note takers, an email tracker from a vendor that apparently went under in 2023, and a bunch of publisher names I couldnt place.

User consent was never actually off. Someone switched on the admin consent workflow about 18 months ago and everyone assumed that closed it. It does not, its a separate setting. So everything is just there. No owner, no ticket, no record of why.

And the grants dont expire on their own. Anything still holding a refresh token could be reading mail right now and I'd only know by going app by app through the sign-in logs.

Security also has axonius connected to entra, and the same 61 show up there with the users who consented to each, so at least the two lists agree. neither one tells me which apps matter.

Plan for this week is boring. Export the list, sort by permission, email every user who consented and ask if they still use it. Anything without an answer by friday gets disabled.