Basically, India never joins asia, are settled by Africans but are converted to Islam around the same time Islam is spread down to Zanzibar, probably colonised by Oman at some point which heavily influenced the country to colonise parts of Africa when they became their own country.

Mascara, similar to Ethiopia, resists European conquests and probably conquers the whole Mascara Island in the late 1800s, however their holdings outside of Mascara Island are stripped away.

See the Full Quality Version on my DeviantArt page%3A-2.400-BCE-1396467246)

Map was made on a phone without using digital pen. Also i would love to ask what tools u using to make the maps realistic or much smoother.

The Third World War: The Seventeenth Day
21 August 2028 · 10:47 a.m. Pacific Time
From The Collapse of the International Order: A History of the Third World War, 2028–????

By the morning of 21 August 2028, the Third World War had entered its seventeenth day, and the international order that had governed the world since the conclusion of the Second World War had effectively ceased to function. What had begun on 5 August as a series of military confrontations between the world’s leading powers had expanded into a conflict spanning four continents and nearly every major ocean. Nuclear weapons had already been detonated thirteen times, Mongolia had disappeared as an independent functioning state, Taiwan was surrounded by hostile naval forces, and some of the world’s most important maritime passages had been closed. The speed of the deterioration had astonished even those who had spent decades warning of another global war.

The conflict was increasingly understood as a confrontation between two loosely coordinated military coalitions. The Axis consisted principally of Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, Belarus, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Cuba and Venezuela, supported by Palestinian armed organisations and several aligned militias. Opposing them were NATO, Ukraine, Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Morocco, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Australia and New Zealand. India had firmly aligned itself with the Allied camp, supplying logistical assistance, intelligence and military equipment, although its direct involvement remained limited. Neither coalition possessed the political cohesion associated with the alliances of the previous world wars. Countries frequently disagreed over military objectives, acceptable levels of escalation and the extent to which their own populations should be exposed to retaliation.

The defining development of the opening seventeen days was the unprecedented speed with which nuclear weapons had entered the conflict. Of the thirteen recorded nuclear detonations, nine had been carried out by Axis forces and four by the Allies. Four Axis strikes had occurred in the Baltic states, two in eastern Ukraine and three in territories of North Korea that had fallen to advancing South Korean forces. Allied retaliation had included two nuclear strikes inside Belarus, one in the northwest and another in the east, a strike within North Korea and a nuclear detonation on Iran’s Qeshm Island. Although most of the weapons were believed to have been relatively low-yield tactical warheads, the distinction offered little reassurance to populations living near the affected areas. Radiation monitoring, the evacuation of settlements and the treatment of casualties had become immediate concerns for governments already struggling to maintain conventional military operations.

Europe had experienced the most consequential political consequences of the nuclear exchanges. The four Axis detonations in the Baltic states marked the first use of nuclear weapons against the territory of NATO member states during an active war between the alliance and Russia. In Tallinn, Riga and Vilnius, emergency administrations coordinated evacuations, organised civilian shelters and attempted to preserve essential services. The nuclear strikes had not forced NATO to withdraw from the region. Instead, they had strengthened the determination of several European governments to continue fighting, while simultaneously producing growing public opposition to further nuclear retaliation. The continent was divided between those who believed that Russia could only be deterred through overwhelming military resistance and those who feared that the continued exchange of tactical nuclear weapons would eventually make the destruction of European cities unavoidable.

The war in Ukraine had entered a particularly destructive phase. Russian forces were fighting both Ukrainian formations and increasingly substantial Allied support operations, while two Axis nuclear detonations in eastern Ukraine had rendered sections of the battlefield hazardous and disrupted local military movements. The Ukrainian government continued to operate from Kyiv, refusing proposals that would require the permanent surrender of occupied territory. Meanwhile, the Allied nuclear strikes in northwestern and eastern Belarus had transformed Belarus from a supporting participant in Russia’s European campaign into a direct nuclear battlefield. Belarusian authorities accused NATO of attacking their country’s sovereignty, while Allied governments argued that Belarusian territory had become an operational extension of the Russian military. Neither interpretation offered much comfort to civilians forced to abandon their homes.

Farther north, the Baltic Sea had become one of the most heavily contested maritime regions in the world. Russian naval forces operating from Kaliningrad and the eastern Baltic faced the combined pressure of NATO’s northern European fleets, while Finland and Sweden had become indispensable to the alliance’s regional defence. The Russian exclave of Kaliningrad found itself increasingly isolated, with its land connections dependent upon a hostile regional environment and its maritime access subject to Allied surveillance and interdiction. Norway had reinforced its northern territories as Russian military activity increased in the Arctic, raising fears that the war might spread beyond the already active European frontlines.

In Asia, the complete occupation of Mongolia represented the largest immediate territorial transformation of the war. Russian and Chinese forces had entered the country from opposite directions during the opening phase of hostilities, overwhelming its ability to organise an effective national defence. Mongolia’s comparatively small population, limited military capabilities and geographical isolation made sustained resistance extraordinarily difficult. By 21 August, the country had been divided between Russian and Chinese military administrations, with Russia controlling the northern territories and China occupying the south. Ulaanbaatar had fallen under Russian military administration, while Chinese authorities established control over the southern transport corridors and resource-producing regions. The partition remained officially provisional, but neither Moscow nor Beijing had provided a timetable for restoring Mongolian independence.

The destruction of Mongolian sovereignty had consequences far beyond Central Asia. For decades, Mongolia had balanced its relations with Russia and China while cultivating diplomatic relationships with countries further abroad. Its occupation demonstrated that states attempting to remain neutral could still become casualties of the conflict. Governments in Central Asia began reviewing their own security arrangements, particularly Kazakhstan, whose enormous frontier with Russia made its leadership acutely aware of the dangers of isolation. International condemnation of the partition was widespread, but the United Nations Security Council proved incapable of adopting meaningful enforcement measures against two of its permanent members. Mongolia’s government-in-exile appealed for international recognition, while thousands of Mongolians attempted to escape the occupation through whatever routes remained available.
The Korean Peninsula had become the most intense conventional battlefield in East Asia. South Korean forces, supported by American intelligence, aircraft and naval assets, had achieved significant early breakthroughs across sections of the heavily fortified border. Several North Korean defensive positions had collapsed, allowing Allied formations to advance into territory that Pyongyang had controlled before the war. The North Korean leadership responded by authorising three nuclear detonations against its own lost territories, targeting areas now occupied by South Korean troops. The strikes reflected the regime’s willingness to devastate portions of its own country rather than accept a major military defeat. An Allied nuclear detonation elsewhere in North Korea subsequently demonstrated that Pyongyang could no longer assume its enemies would refrain from nuclear retaliation.

China and Russia had begun reinforcing the North Korean military, although the scale of their deployments remained limited by the extraordinary demands of their other fronts. Beijing faced the difficult task of maintaining operations against Taiwan, containing Japanese and American naval forces, supplying North Korea and defending its own coastline. Russia faced a similar dilemma, dividing military resources between Europe, its Far Eastern territories and the Korean Peninsula. Despite receiving assistance, North Korea’s armed forces had suffered serious disruption. In Seoul, the government celebrated the early advances cautiously, recognising that rapid territorial gains could become strategically dangerous if Chinese reinforcements arrived before the northern military structure collapsed.

Taiwan, meanwhile, had been subjected to a near-complete maritime encirclement. Chinese forces had established effective control over the surrounding sea approaches, preventing Allied warships from maintaining reliable direct access to Taiwanese ports. Merchant shipping had largely ceased, and Taiwan’s economy was increasingly dependent upon existing stockpiles of fuel, food and military supplies. Yet despite this apparent strategic success, Chinese forces had not attempted a major landing on the island. Taiwan’s extensive coastal defences, mobilised reserves, fortified urban areas and surviving military capabilities made an amphibious invasion an extremely uncertain undertaking. The encirclement was therefore a victory in maritime positioning rather than territorial conquest, and Taiwanese authorities remained in control of the island’s principal cities and governmental institutions.
Japan had become a central participant in the wider Pacific conflict. Chinese and North Korean missile attacks had struck military facilities and infrastructure, while Russian naval and air activity threatened the country’s northern approaches. Japanese forces were mobilising to defend Hokkaido, the Ryukyu Islands and their maritime supply routes. The United States maintained substantial forces in Japan, but Washington’s ability to reinforce the region had become increasingly constrained by its simultaneous commitments in Europe and the Western Hemisphere. Australia and New Zealand had increased military readiness and begun coordinating maritime protection operations, recognising that a prolonged disruption of Pacific shipping could threaten their economic security even without a direct invasion of their territories.

India occupied an unusual position within the Allied coalition. Although politically committed to resisting the Axis, New Delhi had avoided declaring an unrestricted war against China. The Himalayan frontier experienced artillery exchanges, drone activity and occasional incursions, but neither government had committed to a major territorial offensive. Similar tensions developed along India’s northeastern frontier with Burma, where Axis-aligned government forces and anti-government resistance groups were already engaged in a complicated internal conflict. India’s restraint reflected both the dangers of escalation with another nuclear-armed state and the need to preserve military resources for the defence of its own territory. Its support for the Allies nevertheless provided the coalition with a major economic and logistical partner in the Indian Ocean.

The Middle East had suffered an equally dramatic breakdown in regional security. Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz had disrupted one of the world’s most important energy corridors, trapping commercial shipping inside the Persian Gulf and forcing international oil markets into crisis. The Allied nuclear detonation on Qeshm Island had introduced radioactive contamination concerns into an already dangerous maritime environment. Iranian authorities declared that the attack would not force the reopening of the strait, while Allied leaders argued that freedom of navigation could not be restored while Iranian military forces retained the ability to threaten vessels attempting passage. The resulting confrontation placed Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar in an increasingly precarious position, with their economic infrastructure exposed to missile attacks and their traditional export routes severely restricted.

Egypt’s decision to close the Suez Canal to Axis military vessels further transformed the strategic geography of the war. Although Allied shipping retained permission to use the canal, security restrictions and the fighting around the Red Sea had drastically reduced normal commercial movement. At the opposite end of the Mediterranean, the Strait of Gibraltar was closed to Axis military traffic through the combined efforts of Britain, Spain, Morocco and their allies. Türkiye had likewise prohibited Axis military passage through the Bosphorus, restricting Russia’s ability to reinforce its Black Sea naval forces from outside the region. These restrictions collectively created a maritime barrier around much of the European theatre, even as they forced neutral shipping companies to navigate an increasingly complicated network of inspections, exclusions and military-controlled corridors.

The closure of the Strait of Malacca to all military traffic was particularly significant because it applied equally to both coalitions. Southeast Asian governments sought to prevent the conflict from transforming the narrow passage into a direct battlefield between Chinese and American fleets. The prohibition did not end the surrounding naval confrontation, but it forced military vessels to seek alternative routes through Indonesian waters or the wider Pacific. Singapore’s commercial importance made the decision especially consequential. Insurance costs rose, shipping schedules became unreliable and businesses dependent upon precisely timed deliveries began reducing production. The closure also revealed the limitations of neutrality: although regional governments could declare the strait closed, maintaining that prohibition against the world’s largest navies required constant diplomatic pressure.

Across the Atlantic, Cuba and Venezuela had become the principal Axis-aligned states in the Western Hemisphere. The United States responded by reinforcing its southeastern coastline, increasing naval operations in the Caribbean and mobilising additional military formations. Cuba’s proximity to Florida created particular anxiety among American civilians, many of whom had never experienced the prospect of sustained military attacks against their own territory. Venezuela’s involvement complicated the defence of Caribbean sea lanes and increased pressure on Dutch, British and American territories throughout the region. Neither Cuba nor Venezuela possessed the conventional military strength to invade the mainland United States, but their participation ensured that Washington could no longer treat the Western Hemisphere as a secure rear area.
The economic consequences of the war developed faster than governments could respond. The simultaneous disruption of Hormuz, Suez, Gibraltar, the Bosphorus and Malacca forced major changes to international shipping routes. Energy prices rose sharply as traders struggled to assess the availability of Middle Eastern exports, while shipping companies diverted vessels around Africa and away from the western Pacific. Financial markets became exceptionally volatile, several governments temporarily restricted trading, and international investment shifted towards emergency liquidity and domestic security. Manufacturers began reporting shortages of electronic components, industrial chemicals and specialised machinery. The destruction of infrastructure in Ukraine, Korea and the Baltic states further disrupted supplies of agricultural products, metals and manufactured goods.

Civilian life changed dramatically during the first seventeen days. Emergency alerts became a daily occurrence in cities across Europe, East Asia and the Middle East. Public transport systems were converted into temporary shelters, hospitals began preparing for mass-casualty events, and governments issued guidance concerning radioactive fallout. In several countries, schools suspended normal operations while authorities assessed the availability of shelters and evacuation routes. Supermarkets introduced purchasing limits on essential goods, fuel queues became increasingly common and international air travel contracted sharply. Families separated by the war faced communications disruptions and increasingly limited opportunities to reunite. For millions of people, the most immediate consequence of the conflict was not the movement of armies but the sudden disappearance of ordinary routines.

The war also transformed global information networks. Social media platforms struggled to distinguish genuine battlefield footage from fabricated reports, recycled videos and government propaganda. Images of nuclear mushroom clouds circulated continuously, often without reliable information about their locations or dates. Several governments restricted access to foreign news sources, arguing that hostile information campaigns threatened national security. Journalists operating in the most dangerous regions faced substantial restrictions, and the destruction of communications infrastructure made independent casualty verification almost impossible. As a result, the number of people killed during the first seventeen days remained uncertain, with different governments publishing sharply conflicting estimates.

Not every country had entered the conflict. Brazil, Argentina, South Africa, Indonesia and numerous other states attempted to preserve varying degrees of neutrality, although economic disruption and diplomatic pressure increasingly constrained their choices. International humanitarian organisations warned that the war threatened to divert resources from existing food emergencies and displacement crises. The United Nations continued operating, but its ability to coordinate an effective response was severely diminished by the participation of permanent Security Council members on opposing sides. Diplomatic discussions increasingly took place through neutral intermediaries, with Switzerland, Brazil and several other governments attempting to maintain communication between the coalitions.

By 10:47 a.m. Pacific time on 21 August, the immediate military situation remained profoundly uncertain. The Axis had achieved the occupation and partition of Mongolia, established maritime control around Taiwan and inflicted devastating nuclear strikes in Europe and Korea. The Allies had prevented the fall of Taiwan, achieved early advances into North Korea and demonstrated their capacity to retaliate across several theatres. Neither coalition had secured a decisive global advantage. More importantly, neither had established a credible mechanism for preventing further nuclear escalation.

The central paradox of the seventeenth day was that the world’s governments continued to conduct the war as though it could still be limited, despite having already crossed almost every threshold that previous generations had considered unacceptable. Nuclear weapons had been used repeatedly, neutral territory had been occupied, and the international trading system had begun to fracture. Yet financial institutions still opened, civilian aircraft still crossed portions of the world’s skies, diplomats still exchanged proposals, and millions of people continued to go to work.

Later historians would identify this period as the moment when the Third World War ceased to be understood as a temporary emergency and began to reshape the political, economic and social structures of the modern world. The thirteen nuclear detonations of its first seventeen days had not produced the immediate destruction of civilisation that Cold War planners had once feared. Instead, they had created something arguably more destabilising: a world in which nuclear warfare had become an accepted operational reality, while the institutions intended to prevent a catastrophic escalation remained dangerously inadequate.

At 10:47 a.m. on 21 August 2028, the world had not ended. It had simply entered an era in which nobody could be certain that it would survive the next morning.

After the African American Rebellion against Columbia and the Columbians gets closer to the France Empire and the Texans and New Englanders and new Africa allies with the league of Allies.

I'm currently writing up the lore sooooo... feel free to ask :3

Last year I made a map showcasing the modern day Most Serene Imperial Republic of Venice. Today I finally finished the full world map of that same setting! The setting itself is based on my EU4 campaign as Venice. I was inspired by it and went about imagining how world history would have played out from the end of my campaing to the present day. I hope you liek it! It's my first world map, and if there is interest, I thought about posting more info maps about the setting. Feel free to ask any questions!

Confederation Of Columbia is a decentralized country and made up with 6 Republics and it's one of the losers of WW1 and WW2 and in 1995 is the year that the Confederation Of Columbia collapsed due to the civil rights and really unstable.

And by the way WW3 happened in 1983 between the German empire and Russian imperial State.

That's all I got to say.

Novamtys is the third planet of the Purple Sun. It is wholly unique among all the worlds of the Solar System for its shape, being made up of two binary planets that have collided into a single stable planetary body.

The planet has long been an object of fascination among astronomers on Galladria (the fourth planet of the Purple Sun)

With the establishment and opening of a stable and permanent Celestial Gate, connecting Novamtys and Galladria, Aelnyyraean scholars been able to examine the planet from up close. Aelnyyraean Mages have discovered that the planet is affected by a vast Precursor spellwork. Decryption has largely been deemed impossible due to its complexity, but from what little has been gleamed, it is believed that the spellwork is responsible for the planet's stabilization.

(also, second map lacks the territory of other civs, cus I haven't yet actually decided who will originally populate the world, if anyone at all)

Little to no lore for this specific map as of yet, it is 11:30 I will message it later

Bsk: Temperate/cold steppe

Cfb: Oceanic climate

Cfc: Subpolar oceanic climate

Dsa: Continental climate (dry summer, hot summer)

Dsb: Continental (dry summer, warm summer)

Dsc: Continental (dry summer, cold summer)

Et: Alpine or tundra climate.

It's my first map so it's not really the best, I hope you guys like it though

SCHWARZENBERG has been described by academics and popular culture alike as the “Founding Father of Germany”. The implied comparison is unflattering to his American counterparts, but fair: His 1850 constitution, hazed out in smoke-filled rooms by cigar-chomping bureaucrats and shellshocked royal dignitaries rather than revolutionary idealists, could only be considered a triumph by the most pridefully timid Anglophiles and the most exhausted democrats. It is far more conservative than the provisional constitution (roughly the OTL 1849 Frankfurt constitution). For example, the provisional constitution freed education from clerical oversight; the 1850 constitution does not, and implies education is largely left to the states. The states surrender important powers over diplomacy, customs, currency, and military affairs, but the central bureaucracy is still small, and the Imperial Diet is left to build national institutions and harmonize administration itself. In practice the Reich's legislative reach often outran its administrative capacity, leaving imperial law in the hands of officials who answered primarily to the states. The Reichsgericht (supreme court) quickly became the central institution for settling disputes between the Reich and the states. The languages and cultures of “non-German speaking peoples”  are constitutionally protected, but how far that protection goes is left open.

The Volkshaus is elected via secret ballot using a single-member, two-round absolute-majority system: a candidate needs >50% in the first ballot; otherwise the top two go to a Stichwahl (runoff).

Suffrage is initially restricted to men aged 25 and over, with the Reichswahlgesetz having a provision along these lines: “The franchise belongs to every male citizen of the Reich who has completed his twenty-fifth year, is of unblemished civil standing, and possesses economic and civic independence (wirtschaftliche und bürgerliche Selbständigkeit).”

A separate provision excludes those under guardianship, in active bankruptcy proceedings, receiving public poor relief, or deprived of civil rights by criminal judgment.

It does not explicitly exclude wage earners. Instead, the Schmerling government's first electoral regulations instruct officials to regard men in a relationship of personal or economic dependence as lacking Selbständigkeit. This initially includes most servants, apprentices, dependent journeymen, ordinary wage laborers and adult sons working within their fathers' households.

This is a post-Prussian-crisis revival of a principle previously defeated at Frankfurt. The “definition” of Selbständigkeit is gradually broadened over subsequent decades due to constant legal battles, because the number of adult men that live by wages drastically increases, making their exclusion increasingly silly. By the 1870s the electorate has drastically increased, but universal manhood suffrage has still not been achieved, with governing liberals increasingly fearful that further expansion would primarily strengthen the Socialists and conservative-clerical parties.

Confidence works like this:

• The Minister-President and ministers are appointed and dismissed by the Emperor.
• Imperial ministers are responsible for the exercise of executive power, and major imperial acts require ministerial countersignature.
• The government need not obtain an affirmative parliamentary investiture.
• The Volkshaus exercises binding legislative and budgetary authority.
• A government defeated on a major matter may remain in office, but a clear parliamentary withdrawal of confidence eventually requires resignation or dissolution.
• The Emperor retains the right to dissolve the Volkshaus and seek a new election, subject to safeguards against indefinitely circumventing Parliament.

Additionally, in 1858 the FP passed the crown jewel of its achievements: A package of reforms including a permanent budget committee with access to detailed ministerial accounts, requiring ministers to respond to questions from deputies, annual publication of comprehensive imperial accounts with an independent auditing institution, and pretty robust powers for committees investigating misconduct. This basically guaranteed that the Imperial Diet couldn’t be made toothless.

Franz Joseph did not begin his reign as a constitutionalist. A deeply conservative young monarch, he accepted Schwarzenberg's settlement largely out of necessity, and initially regarded many of its limitations on imperial authority with deep resentment. Over time—and with a great deal of patience from Minister-President Schmerling—he became an exceptionally capable constitutional monarch, though never a liberal. He remained a highly active participant in government, particularly in ministerial appointments, military affairs, and diplomacy, but gradually came to understand that openly exercising his authority could sometimes weaken it. Stubborn and occasionally prone to misjudging the Imperial Diet, he nevertheless learned to pick his battles, preferring private negotiations, quiet interventions, and ministerial influence to public constitutional confrontations he was unlikely to win. His political influence was substantial, but his public partisan footprint was small. He cultivated the image of a dignified, dutiful functionary who stood above ordinary party politics, and consequently enjoyed real personal respect even among republicans. Republicanism remained a significant political movement, but few considered the actual abolition of the monarchy a realistic prospect during his lifetime. 

His formal powers remained relatively constant, while the conventions governing their exercise changed considerably. By 1880, organized parliamentary parties had accumulated enough influence that the Emperor possessed much less practical freedom than he had in 1850, even though the constitution granted him essentially the same authority.

"If Germany were proclaimed a republic tomorrow, we would elect Franz Joseph its first President the day after—and grant him powers he would never dare exercise as Emperor." 

- Robert Blum, 1871

Political Parties:

Social Democratic Workers’ Party (Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei, SDAP)

• BOO!

Free-Minded Radical Democratic Party (Freisinnige Radikaldemokratische Partei, FRdP)

• Offshoot of the FP and DVP following the FP becoming “elitist” and the DVP becoming “Prussian”. Formed in opposition to the policies of an RLP–FP coalition government in the 1860s, it massively gained popularity after the RLP’s 1870s electoral collapse and subsequent electoral alliance with the FP.
• Situated to the left of the Progressive Party. Supports Republicanism, Free Trade, legal unions, cheap bread, free schools, deputy salaries, Universal Suffrage, and Laïcité. Opposes colonialism.
• Everybody knows they’re Republicans, but they’re rather lowkey about that part.

Progressive Party (Fortschrittspartei, FP)

• Liberal-reformist party, formed shortly after the 1850 election by independent liberal legislators. Wants more Parliamentary control, universal suffrage, proportional taxes, state oversight of church schools, and a bunch of other liberal reforms.
• Eventually entered a permanent political alliance with the RLP in the 1870s.
• Has a smorgasbord of achievements but was completely unable to achieve universal male suffrage, full parliamentary responsibility for ministers, or comprehensive secularization of education.
• Support for universal suffrage became much less enthusiastic over time, until it became a priority again following electoral defeats. Their “universal suffrage” would still have a two-year residence requirement, which would quietly re-exclude the mobile young workers the household franchise already shuts out, among other friendly sounding restrictions.

Imperial Liberal Party (Reichsliberale Partei, RLP)

• Initially the natural party of government. Descendant of the Casino faction. At first an enormous network of respectable constitutional liberals, officials, lawyers, professors, businessmen and local notables who rally around the new settlement.
• Liberal-Conservative, Habsburg Loyalist, and Pragmatic. 
• Really liked calling themselves “the Whigs” and the Conservatives “the Tories” for the first few years until they realized everyone thought it was weird and lame and it wasn’t catching on.

Free Conservative Party (Freikonservative Partei, FKP)

• A Conservative Party that split from the German Imperial Party over the DRP’s relative apathy towards Austrian domination. Disproportionately Protestant compared to the DRP. Economically liberal and suspicious of paternalistic state intervention.
• The whole party initially accepts the Empire's protectionist tariff regime as a practical necessity, but develops a powerful free-trade wing during the 1850s and 1860s. The two wings are Freihändler (economic liberals, bourgeois, commercially oriented, disproportionately northern/Protestant, more committed to strong national institutions but still suspicious of Austrian domination) and Schutzzöllner (agrarian and provincial conservatives, protectionists, a bit insular, increasingly receptive to clerical and paternalist conservatism)
• Considers the development of a massive overseas empire to be financially ruinous and largely pointless. The British will defend German investments anyway.

German Imperial Party (Deutsche Reichspartei, DRP)

• Conservative Party, which represents the traditional political establishment and landlords. Generally leans Catholic. What unites them is hierarchy, landed property, monarchy and suspicion of continued revolutionary reform.
• Not really a “party” yet during the 1850 election, but a very embryonic caucus of conservative legislators.
• Still thinks the mild quasi-endorsement of an 80 year old Metternich means something.
• Reluctant to act like a proper mass party. Eventually becomes a bit of a joke, filled with old weirdos elected via traditional patronage, until it's absorbed into the CKP.
• It holds on a bit better in the Staatenhaus.

Christian Conservative Party (Christlich-Konservative Partei, CKP)

• In the early 1860s, the RLP–FKP coalition formed around what they both considered “modernization”. The Schutzzöllner wing of the FKP hated this, because abstract complaining about excessive government intervention suddenly became concrete policy, and pissed off. They don’t want to join the DRP, because it's kind of embarrassing and crusty. So a new party is formed.
• This party is monarchist, protectionist, agrarian, clerical-friendly, anti-socialist, corporatist, and suspicious of liberal secularization.
• This is an interconfessional conservative coalition with a disproportionately Catholic clerical/aristocratic core and a substantial Protestant agrarian wing.
• Favors an aggressive colonial policy with state-led territorial expansion, because of protectionism and missionaries.

German People’s Party (Deutsche Volkspartei, DVP)

• Begins as a broad radical-democratic party containing urban republicans, anticlerical intellectuals, revolutionary nationalists, artisans, peasants, early socialists. Republican, anti-clerical, democratic, revanchist against Prussia (though many want Bohemia and Slovenia to be independent), and opposed to standing armies.
• The Social Democrats pull the organized working-class left away. The Progressives and eventually the Radicals pull respectable constitutional democrats away. Republicanism itself becomes less urgent as generations grow up under a functioning constitutional empire, except for a lot of Protestants that distrust the Habsburg Monarchy. What’s left is a portion of the radical nationalist, anticlerical, highly educated urban/professional wing, and a lot of people who couldn’t vote in the first place.
• Was at its lowest in the late 1860s/early 1870s, where it occasionally failed to win any seats despite having a lot of members and a downright comical level of organization. At this point it's kind of an incoherent, directionless revanchist party pissed off about things people already came to terms with. 1848 members holding onto their seats on personal reputation retire/die, people in its clubs vote RLP/FKP or just can’t vote, and the vote is thin and scattered.
• Could still technically be construed as just militant anti-clerical democrats until the Long Depression. The subsequent CKP-BNP-KNP coalition pisses them off even more due to minority protections and clericalism. And some Jewish conspiracies on the side.
• Ideas of every citizen being in a militia transformed into an obsession with the “nation in arms” and universal conscription to fight back against the French, Prussians, Danish, Russians, reactionaries, whatever. Gymnastics clubs and rifle clubs make it semi-paramilitarized. “Germany must produce its own Bonaparte.”
• Not pro-universal suffrage. Too many citizens have foreign influence, so favors kind of draconian suffrage restrictions.
• Theoretically not anti-parliamentary as of 1880, still insists parliament should be sovereign, though parliament itself may or may not become the problem if Catholics continue to win elections.
• Leader since 1874 is Georg von Schönerer.
• A lot more old-school statist than it is corporatist.
• In 1878, a book titled Die Königinhofer Lüge: Wie Rußland die Tschechen erfand ("The Königinhof Lie: How Russia Invented the Czechs") was published. The book declares Czech a false identity invented by Russian-funded professors that handed them a largely forged history and invented language, and goes on to detail a vast conspiracy begun in 1712 by Peter the Great. The DVP believes 100% of it.

Bohemian National Party (Böhmische Nationalpartei, BNP)

• Broad Czech national coalition advocating recognition of Czech, restoration/protection of the constitutional rights of the Bohemian Crownlands, and extensive federal autonomy. Its leadership leans liberal, but in 1850 it has a very big tent that includes Catholic conservatives.
• Still hasn’t managed to create a Bohemian state by 1880 lol.
• Later the Free Conservative Party peels away a lot of its Conservative membership. “I don’t want Prague lawyers running everything,” says the Czech peasant. Because the FKP develops Czech-speaking local organizations and remains officially non-confessional.

Slovene National Party (Slovenska narodna stranka / Slowenische Nationalpartei, SNP)

• Wants all Slovene-majority territory consolidated into an autonomous Slovenia within the German Empire. Liberal and secular in nature.

Catholic National Party (Katholische Nationalpartei, KNP)

• Slovene party that split from the SNP because it’s too secular/liberal
• Integralist, a bit more accepting of Habsburg rule and German influence than the SNP
• Hates the other Slovene parties more than it hates the other Catholic-conservative parties.
• Still kinda cares about Slovene autonomy/rights but integralism makes them massive bootlickers willing to sell out.

Istrian Party (Partito Istriano, PI)

• Successor to the Candidati nazionali italiani, a loose band of Italian town notables who had sent a few deputies from Trieste, Istria and Fiume since 1850. It finally organized as a real party in 1876–77, once the 1875 franchise statute put thousands of Croat and Slovene villagers (*retch*) on the roll.
• “Istria”, in PI usage, runs from Gradisca to Fiume; it sounds friendlier than “the Julian March”.
• Wants an autonomous Istria with its own Diet (for affluent Italians), (Italian) schools, and self-government (for the coastal towns). It’s very much in favour of Istrian self-government, as long as Istria is self-governed by the people who already govern it (That’s the self part). 
• Liberal, secular and anticlerical, which puts it firmly against the CKP–BNP–KNP coalition. Wins the runoff due to German voters and its massive political machine.

Czecho-Slovak National Party (Česko-slovenská národní strana, CSP)

• Disagrees with the notion of the “Bohemian crown being an ancient and autonomous political entity within the German constitutional” blah blah blah whatever the other party says. Thinks German rule over Czechia is illegitimate. Split from the Bohemian National Party over its coalition with the CKP.
• Also frustrated by the little headway made by the “collaborationist” BNP, and by a nationalist Austrian state government actively rolling back protections.
• Has a considerable Russophilic element

Low German Party (Niederdeutsche Partei, NDP)

• Agrarian party that advocates for the interests of “Low Germans”, whatever that means. Like 99% Protestant. Wants more Federalism, protections for Protestants, and the Low German language protected. There are a few strands:
  • Low German federalists, who want more autonomy for Low German states. This is the vast, vast majority of them.
  • Low German separatists, who want an independent “Low German” (usually Hannover, Oldenburg, and Holstein. Occasionally other stuff) state. This eventually gets squashed as the NDP becomes more mainstream. Contented by a long term demand for a unified Low German state.
  • Prussian unionists, who want to secede and join Prussia. This faction is pretty quiet for a while, and is content advocating for peaceful relations and reunification.
• Uses a very unique black-white-red flag, until the Prussian associations of the black-white part cause them to scrap it in favor of the blue-white-red Schleswig-Holstein flag with a Sachsenross in the middle.
• 1849–54: After its humiliation, the restored Prussian regime increasingly insists that Prussia is not merely a failed claimant to Germany but a distinct historical state with its own political destiny. At first this is mostly dynastic and constitutional, not linguistic.
• 1853–58: Reuter/Groth-type literature becomes more politically charged in Hanover, Oldenburg, Holstein, Hamburg/Bremen, etc. This is still primarily a cultural movement at first.
• 1857–60: A royal commission standardizes a written form based on East/Brandenburg Low German and related northern forms; school primers, patriotic songs, army publications, and some local administrations begin using it. The state calls it Preußisch, while Germans outside Prussia mockingly call it things like “Staatsplatt.” Initially a bit of a novelty, this becomes a very conscious state-building project once Otto von Bismarck comes to power. Apart from the obvious benefit of shutting pro-German Liberals up, the logic is sound: If the Low Germans of the Empire accept “Prussian” as a distinct identity, they drift towards Prussia. If they recoil and accelerate the construction of their own “Plattdeutsch” identity, they have stopped treating “German” as one obvious nation. All Bismarck has to do is keep a friendly face to keep most of the resentment aimed at Vienna/Frankfurt, and it's a win-win.
• 1860–64: Imperial northern Protestants increasingly resent both Habsburg/Catholic dominance and Prussia’s attempt to monopolize Low German identity. Local electoral leagues appear first, then the party in 1865. Adopts a broad policy of detente towards Bismarck’s Prussia, despite being annoyed to death by Staatsplatt.
• Late 1860s: Standardized “Prussian” becomes compulsory or semi-compulsory in primary schools and expands into local administration/army life. High German remains important for diplomacy, higher education, and interstate business for a long time. The backlash hardens the NDP’s support for its own “Plattdeutsch” language.
• 1872–74: Following considerable pressure, Wilhelm I dismisses Chancellor Bismarck, ending the détente between Germany and Prussia. After the 1873 Vienna crash, Bennigsen’s FKP shares the blame, and its Protestant voters across the Low German countryside go over to the NDP, which more than doubles its seats in 1874. 
• 1880: Talks to bring the NDP into Hohenwart’s government almost fell through, because nobody likes their stupid language and people would rather deal with a minority government than with Platt. Got a few concessions, though.

Prussian National Party (Preußische Nationale Partei, PNP)

• Far-right party that advocates for the secession of “Low Germany” into Prussia. It is illiberal, militaristic, authoritarian, and admires the reactionary Prussian state.

Source maps:

German Confederation: HGIS Germany 

German Administrative District Boundaries: https://hgl.harvard.edu/catalog/harvard-germany-admin-1890 

Austria-Hungary: GISta Hungarorum 

Czech lands: Czoernig's dataset, which is sourced from Karel Kuča's CZ_RETRO project 

Demographics were estimates, loosely based on census figures.

I will post the tools and graphics stuff I built to make the map/posters/simulate results soon on github after I clean it all up, but don’t expect it to be useful for much. HTML is the worst thing I've ever learned.

Also ignore munich having a random straight line through it or Vienna looking like abstract art thank you