Additionally wasn’t the motivation to sail to the Americas based on Europe’s geopolitical/geographic situation when it came to trade. I don’t see why China would want to do so.

Also I know about Zheng He but even if they had kept his fleet and used it for colonization wouldn’t they be more likely to create said colonies in south east Asia rather than the Americas?

I teach Theory of Knowledge, and I often use the First Emperor's tomb as an example of how we "know" things we have never seen. Sima Qian described rivers of mercury and a ceiling of stars, and soil tests around the mound have found unusually high mercury levels. Yet archaeologists still won't open it, mostly because they saw the Terracotta Army's paint flake away within minutes of exposure. So I'm curious what this community thinks: is waiting for better technology the responsible choice, or are we losing knowledge by waiting? And if you could see one thing inside, what would it be?

The procession moved through the drizzling rain from the Jile Funeral Home to the Nangang Cemetery in Taipei. Roughly 300,000 citizens—nearly one-third of the city’s entire population at the time—spontaneously lined the streets. Families set up roadside altars, burned incense, and wept as they surrounded the hearse, gridlocking the city. This massive gathering was not a mournful pity party for a defeated man. It was an unofficial, societal "audit" that validated Hu Shih's lifelong commitment to pluralism and intellectual independence.

Hi! I'm interested in United States immigration history and I've been doing some reading about early Chinese immigration to the United States, and I've read about Joss Houses a few times, so I was wondering what religion those were for? Like, were they Buddhist temples?

How did the states of Wei and Han(Warring States) survive being smaller states? What stops the Qin or XIongnu from just ransacking their towns with their mounted archers/crossbowmen?

I'm interested in putting together a personal lecture series on the history of China, mainly because I've noticed there are a lot of great university-level lecture series on YouTube for things like Indian history, European history, etc., but I haven't found quite as many good, comprehensive ones on Chinese history.

I'm not a scholar of Chinese history, so I'm not trying to make an ultra-academic course or pretend to be an expert. But I would like to do a reasonably serious job and base it on good, reputable scholarship rather than just putting together a bunch of Wikipedia-level material.

My initial idea is to make something along the lines of 10–15 lectures, around 30–60 minutes each, covering the broad history of China. Eventually I'd probably split it into something like:

• Part I: Ancient/Imperial China
• Part II: Modern China

For now, though, I mainly want to focus on ancient and imperial China, from the earliest periods through the end of the imperial system.

So I'm looking for recommendations for:

1. Good general histories of China that could serve as the backbone of the course.
2. Books on specific periods/dynasties that would be useful for going deeper where necessary.
3. Any particularly good university lecture series, courses, documentaries, or other resources that you think are worth using.
4. If there are any books that are particularly good for someone who wants a broad chronological overview without getting completely buried in academic detail, I'd especially appreciate those.

I'm basically trying to find the equivalent of a good “Chinese History 101” textbook/course that I can use as a starting point, then supplement with more specialized works when I get to individual dynasties.

I'd be especially interested in hearing what historians/China-history nerds would consider the best starting point, and also what books/resources I should avoid because they're outdated or unreliable.

Thanks!

General question for all of dynastic Chinese history. Where would valuables in ancient cities be stored and if there were any significant changes over time.

If I did find something valuable how would I even sell it?

Also what would I be able to find?

I'm curious because after finishing Chen Jian’s recent biography of Zhou I was shocked to learn that he was actually Mao's superior in the early days of the CCP. In fact, after the split from the KMT and during the chaotic weeks of Chiang Kai-Shek's war against the Party in cities such as Shanghai, Mao could have been left behind. Isolated in a key moment from the rest of Party leadership while they went into hiding. It was only with Zhou's approval, if I remember correctly, that Mao was brought along and only with Zhou's acquiescence Mao took a higher position then him. 

Why though? It doesn't appear cynical. Zhou didn't plan on controlling Mao from the background like a puppetmaster. He genuinely stepped aside. Which, credit where credit is due, is a huge thing for anyone in politics. Especially the cutthroat kind being practiced in China at that era. It really looks like Zhou placed all the hopes of the country on Mao's leadership. But again, why? This question requires a little bit of educated guesswork but I think it's worth contemplating. 

In the Wire, there's a smalltime hood named Slim Charles. Sometimes known as the honorable gangster. He's always in orbit of gang leadership, he's got leader-like qualities, but he's never taken the position of top dog in his organization. Even when there's opportunities to be had. He explicitly markets himself not as a leader. He's the number two guy. Always has been, always will be. Reading the book I could see Enlai in that light. But there was another voice, just as loud and equally persuasive, that said he was simply a dog looking for a master. He joined the CCP, made his way into leadership and found the responsibilities and intrigues either too stressful or too uninteresting and instead decided to exit the "battlefield" and find seek protection from a patron in the form of Mao. I'm not sure which one is true or if it's a little of both. As a patron, Mao surely left much to be desired. He demanded slavish loyalty but rewarded it with betrayal, criticism and suspicion. He doesn't seem to like Zhou, yet depended on him. Zhou respects Mao, sees him as something of visionary — at least in the beginning — but is otherwise inscrutable.

Before Japan's occupation, Northeast China's three provinces were Liaoning, Jilin, and Heilongjiang. After Japan's defeat in 1945, the Nationalist government introduced a nine-province arrangement, subsequently revised in 1947. This official map, published in July 1947, shows that later arrangement.

The nine provinces were Liaoning, Andong, Liaobei, Jilin, Songjiang, Hejiang, Heilongjiang, Nenjiang, and Xing'an. Rehe (Jehol) remained a separate province outside the Nationalists' nine-province scheme. Familiar names such as Liaoning and Heilongjiang therefore refer to territories different from their modern counterparts.

Historian Steven I. Levine interprets the subdivision as an attempt to prevent another powerful regional leader like Zhang Zuolin from building an autonomous Manchurian power base. Smaller provinces, supervised by a regional authority loyal to Chiang Kai-shek, would help the central government curb the regionalism that had characterized the Northeast before the Japanese occupation.

A contemporary U.S. War Department intelligence report also described the subdivision as intended "to enable the Government to administer the area more efficiently as well as to break down the power of local leaders."

This map shows the Nationalist administrative scheme and territorial claims, rather than effective control. A July 1947 American diplomatic report described the Communists as controlling the greater part of Manchuria. The Nationalists still held important cities, including Shenyang and Changchun, but their provincial scheme extended far beyond their effective authority.

The Communists developed their own changing administrative arrangements. Their April 1949 reorganization comprised six provinces—Heilongjiang, Songjiang, Jilin, Liaodong, Liaoxi, and Rehe—or five when Rehe is excluded from the comparison. Western territories were also incorporated into Inner Mongolia, whose autonomous government was established in 1947, with further transfers in 1949.

The strip across the Amur near Blagoveshchensk labeled 江東六十四屯—the "Sixty-Four Villages East of the River"—is colored as part of Heilongjiang despite being under Soviet administration. Russia had taken control of this area in 1900. Farther downstream, the Heixiazi island area at the Amur–Ussuri confluence near Khabarovsk is colored as part of Hejiang despite Soviet control.

Near Manzhouli, comparing the map with the 1911 Qiqihar agreement indicates that its frontier lies farther north than the agreement's alignment. The agreement placed boundary point 61 just 5.341 km northeast of Manzhouli railway station, a location well inside the Chinese territory depicted here.

The nine-province arrangement also had a long afterlife in Taiwan. The Interior Ministry's 1998 national map still displayed the old provincial boundaries alongside contemporary PRC boundaries. By early 2004, the ministry's new mapping program had dropped that national-map series, and historian Wang Wen-lung dates the geography-textbook switch to PRC administrative divisions to the same year.

Sources:

• Official map, Ministry of the Interior, July 1947.
• Steven I. Levine, Anvil of Victory: The Communist Revolution in Manchuria, 1945–1948 (Columbia University Press, 1987), pp. 47 and 111.
• U.S. War Department, Intelligence Review, 14 February 1946, printed p. 21, for administrative efficiency and weakening local leaders.
• American diplomatic report forwarded on 14 July 1947, especially paragraph 5, for Communist control of the greater part of Manchuria.
• Heilongjiang provincial historical chronology, entry for 21 April 1949, for the Communist provincial reorganization, including Rehe.
• Xing’an League government’s administrative history, for the establishment of the Inner Mongolian autonomous government and territorial transfers.
• U.S. Department of State, China–U.S.S.R. Boundary, International Boundary Study No. 64 (revised, 1978), especially pp. 12 and 18, for the border disputes.
• 1911 Qiqihar agreement, reproduced in MacMurray’s treaty collection, vol. I, p. 920, for boundary point 61 near Manzhouli.
• National Museum of Taiwan History catalogue entry for the 1998 official national map, describing its inclusion of both old ROC and contemporary PRC boundaries.
• Liberty Times, 4 January 2004, “官版地圖 不再印中華民國全圖”, for the change in the Interior Ministry’s mapping program.
• Wang Wen-lung, “臺灣中學地理教科書的祖國想像（1949–1999）,” 國史館學術集刊 17 (2008), printed p. 237, for the 2004 textbook change.