The Qing Dynasty had already become a tool of foreign powers, so why did they stand idly by during the Xinhai Revolution?

[u/wojuk]

[u/yisuiyikurong]

At that time, there were roughly three major factions. 

The first consisted of the  Manchu nobility, both high and low ranking, along with their undertrained military forces. This group initially possessed a shred of remaining legitimacy rooted in the  Confucian orthodoxy, but even that was swept away by the influx of revolutionary ideas. 

The second faction comprised the  Han military and political aristocrats, who had risen to power rapidly following the Taiping Rebellion; their leading figures at the time were Zhang Zhidong and Yuan Shikai. They have some supports from Han high-ranking officials. They have an army ie the Beiyang army. But Yuan Shikai was expelled and Zhang died. Manchu tried to dismantle this faction. And it seems the strategy was working. 

The third group was the traditional gentry, most of whom had been integrated into a series of de facto assemblies/congresses (谘议局) mostly provincial level but some also in municipal level. Kind of complex. But overall they were greatly empowered in the late Qing era. They don’t have an army, generally, but they have the money and, by and large, people’s supports. And they also somehow represent the people.

The revolutionary party came last, remaining a minor force until as late as 1910. 

Long story short, the Manchu trashed a very important reform and caused riots from the third group ie the traditional gentry class. The gentry class, esp from the southern China provinces, by and large turned to support the revolutionary party. 

The revolutionary party was super Han-nationalistic at first. And they literally slaughtered the Manchu, greatly impaired the power of the Manchu army and reserves. 

Yuan Shikai, representing the second faction, found himself in a highly advantageous position against a severely weakened Manchu government. Had he been able to eliminate the  revolutionary party as well, he would have emerged as the sole remaining power—a true "winner-take-all" scenario. However, this was not the case. Backed by the influential  gentry class, the revolutionary forces proved to be formidable adversaries, and the two sides locked into months of heavy fighting. This fierce resistance forced Yuan to pivot. Recognizing the risks of a prolonged conflict, he opted for a strategic negotiation, brokering a deal between the Manchu court and the revolutionaries to secure his own position as the new leader of the republic. Ultimately, his strategy succeeded. Throughout this entire transition,  foreign powers watched closely. They realized that maintaining a unified and relatively peaceful China and remaining neutral best served their geopolitical interests. To maximize their benefits, these nations sought to preserve a relative peace, desperate to avoid triggering a wave of  radical nationalism that could easily backfire on foreign interests. Ensuring that trade routes remained open and uninterrupted was paramount. Consequently, forcing all factions to remain at the negotiating table became their best possible option. 

[u/Artistic_Diver8781]

Late Qing history has long been told through the lens of the revolutionaries, often overlooking one crucial fact: the Qing government was trying to strengthen China's independence and reduce foreign control.

The Qing was both a tool for foreign powers to protect their interests and a potential threat to those same interests.

The clearest example was Russia. The Qing sought to tighten its grip on Outer Mongolia through centralization, alienating local Mongol nobles. Russia exploited this resentment, allied with local elites, and backed Mongolian independence. This brought Russia into direct conflict with the Qing, giving it little reason to save the dynasty during the 1911 Revolution.

Japan had a more complex agenda. It considered sending troops to protect its citizens and interests, but also contemplated splitting China into separate northern and southern governments. A divided but stable China may have suited Japan better than one firmly controlled by a strong central government.

Britain sent troops to protect its nationals but avoided getting drawn into the fighting. The British were pragmatic: intervention was costly, and any stable Chinese government they could do business with would do.

So why did foreign powers let the Qing fall?

First, the Qing was not the only regime capable of protecting their interests.

Second, a strong, unified China could threaten those interests.

Third, intervention risked costs far greater than the potential benefits.

There is an interesting parallel with 1949, when the Kuomintang was on the verge of defeat. The United States thought much like Britain had in 1911: intervention was too costly, and the old regime was expendable as long as the new one was willing to deal with Washington.

[u/No_Peach6683]

Were there ever serious proposals to partition China by the Great Powers besides a couple of maps floated around in magazines?

[u/Kitchen-Green36]

First, owing to differences in countries’ overseas power projection capabilities, not all countries were able to intervene in the situation. At that time, there were three countries capable of projecting substantial military force into China: Britain, Russia, and Japan.

For Britain, the rise of Germany posed a tremendous threat, and Europe was like a powder keg ready to explode at any moment. Although Britain had many interests in China, European security was clearly more important, so Britain did not plan to intervene in the Xinhai Revolution on a large scale.

For Russia, China’s descent into internal chaos was an opportunity to realize the “Yellow Russia” plan, but at that time the Trans-Siberian Railway was not yet complete, and it was not easy for Russia to transport troops across Siberia. The disastrous defeat in the Russo-Japanese War had already demonstrated the weakness of the Russian army’s logistics when crossing Siberia. Therefore, Tsarist Russia could not fully realize the “Yellow Russia” plan during the Xinhai Revolution, but it did succeed in instigating the independence of Khalkha Mongolia.

For Japan, the outbreak of revolution in China was a good thing; a divided and unstable China would give Japan ample opportunity to invade. When Sun Yat-sen was in exile in Japan, he also received substantial funding from the Japanese government. However, Britain, the United States, Russia, and other countries were highly vigilant against Japan’s aggression against China. These countries coveted China yet were too far from it; once China fell into prolonged turmoil, Japan would inevitably secure the largest share of the spoils in the scramble for the Qing dynasty’s legacy. Therefore, these countries, such as the United States, constantly emphasized the “principle of equal opportunity,” claiming that all countries should have equal rights in negotiations, trade, and treaty-making with China. In effect, this forcibly brought Japan’s privileges in China to the same level as those of France and Germany. Thus, during the Xinhai Revolution, while Britain and the United States did not intervene themselves, they warned Japan not to intervene unilaterally.