Inflation in September picked back up again after three months of largely stagnating. Overall, prices rose 3.7% from a year ago, and up 0.6% from August.

“The index for gasoline rose 9.1 percent in September, accounting for over half of the monthly all items increase,” the Bureau of Labor Statistics said.

Friday’s number is the final inflation report before November’s pivotal midterm elections, where business owners and consumers have said they will be voting with their bottom line in mind.

Since August, oil prices have risen to more than $106 per barrel from about $80. The price of regular gas, which most consumers buy, has risen 45% since late February, when the Iran war was launched. The price of diesel, which powers businesses, farms, the shipping industry and other critical sectors, has risen 70% since then.

As early voting kicks off this week, the data also comes at a precarious moment for Republicans defending majorities in the House and the Senate. Polls consistently find that inflation and the high cost of living are top issues this year for voters in both parties.

Meanwhile, wage growth has been stagnant for workers. As of September, the growth in wages was pacing at 3% on an annual basis. Paychecks have not grown faster than inflation since March.

SS- nlike the eight previous Special Intensive Revisions (SIRs), the current exercise has resulted in a contraction of the electorate. The numbers raise important questions about the methodology, transparency, and safeguards governing voter-roll revisions in the world's largest democracy.

Electoral integrity requires accurate voter rolls, but accuracy cannot come at the cost of eligible citizens being disenfranchised. The distinction between removing ineligible entries and inadvertently excluding legitimate voters is fundamental. The scale and unusual direction of the reported change warrant public scrutiny, transparent disclosure of the data, and effective mechanisms for affected voters to appeal.

A useful case study in the tension between administrative efficiency, electoral integrity, and universal suffrage.

In less than three weeks’ time Israelis are scheduled to vote in national elections they widely view as the most consequential of their lives. The most common term used in the country these days to describe the salience of the upcoming election is “B’hirot Goraliot”—literally, fate-defining elections. According to a September survey by the Jewish People Policy Institute, 81% of Israelis regard the October 27 election as either “the most important in the country’s history” (40%) or “especially important” (41%).

Popular awareness that the stakes are high, however, has not translated into clear political choices. On the contrary. In its fragmentation, mercuriality, conspiracism, and cast of fantastical characters, contemporary Israeli politics makes Game of Thrones look like The Golden Girls. The political waters in which Israelis are swimming—domestically, in the Palestinian arena, in the region and the wider world—are all swirling.

This translates into chaotic electoral politics. In a country of ten million people, no fewer than thirty-eight parties—including The Pirates Party and a list dedicated to achieving national unity through marijuana consumption—are running for seats in Israel’s 120-member parliament, the Knesset. Even the most dedicated students of Israeli politics have abandoned all hope of remembering the names of its political parties; as they sprout in the morning, then merge, splinter, and defect in the afternoon, or evaporate by nightfall. In this electoral season there is even a character called “Winter,” and Winter is coming, but only if he passes the electoral threshold.

Of the thirty-eight parties in the race, somewhere between eleven and fourteen are expected to achieve the magic 3.25% threshold of valid ballots cast and make it into the Knesset—a minimum of four seats, which means roughly 172,000 votes. The outcome of the elections may well hinge on one or two small parties failing to clear the threshold by a few hundred votes.

But who will sit with whom in what kind of coalition government, under what conditions, and under whose leadership? The range of possible permutations is near infinite, yet some measure of order can be imposed on this shape-shifting mess using scenarios. Five such scenarios are structurally possible. Each needs to be taken seriously, none are inevitable, though some are more likely than others.

Before proceeding to outline each scenario specific to October 27, a word about what the existence of this degree of uncertainty means. Sometimes, to paraphrase George Orwell, the first duty of a sober observer is the restatement of the obvious. Functional democracies do not normally face five alternative outcomes less than three weeks before a crucial election. With rare exceptions, two-party systems produce binary results—either one party wins, or the other. In multi-party systems, like Israel, the range of the possible should extend to no more than a third scenario—the establishment of some form of coalition government. The fact that electoral politics in Israel now deviates from this bounded set of options indicates a degree of democratic volatility and fragility both novel and concerning. Only one scenario points to a path towards national recovery and repair after the terrible traumas of the past few years.

Scenario One: Disruption

The first scenario is one in which the election is postponed, interrupted, or contested so severely that its legitimacy is seriously questioned. This has never happened in seventy-eight years of modern Israeli statehood and would have been unthinkable even five years ago. After three years of a multifront war that is essentially ongoing—Iran, Lebanon, Gaza, the Houthis in Yemen, none of which are resolved—and amidst a combustible internal atmosphere, however, disruption is not a hypothetical and could come from multiple sources. Israelis certainly fear the prospect. An Israel Democracy Institute survey in July found that 72% of Jewish and 58.5% of Arab Israelis believe the integrity of elections is in danger, and that was before repeated warnings in recent days by security chiefs that Israel’s enemies are seeking to subvert the election or exploit it as an opportunity for an armed attack.

We should distinguish between two categories of disruption. The first, and less likely, is formal postponement or the prevention of viable elections due to internal or external violence. Israeli law does not contemplate the possibility of elections being cancelled and a military coup in Israel is outside the realm of credible scenarios. The law does, however, provide for the possible temporary postponement of elections in the event of an extraordinary national emergency that makes voting impossible. There is no exhaustive list for such circumstances, but it would certainly include a large-scale missile attack by Iran and/or its remaining proxies—Shi’a militias in Iraq, Hezbollah in Lebanon, or the Houthis in Yemen. It would also certainly include a surprise attack from a less predictable source, such as Syria, Sinai, or Turkey.

It is unclear whether the outbreak of a Third Intifada in the West Bank, rocket-fire from Gaza, the kidnapping of Israeli soldiers or civilians, large-scale rioting by protestors, or a high-level political assassination taking place shortly before or on elections day, would constitute grounds for postponement. The disruption would have to be widespread and debilitating enough to stymie the process in large parts of this small country. In any case, Israeli law sets strict limits on postponement. Delaying elections cannot be decreed. It requires the passage of Knesset legislation by a supermajority of two-thirds (80 members of Knesset) and the delay caused must be as brief as practicable—a condition that will be closely supervised by the courts.

Disruption may also come in the form of a breakdown of trust in the electoral process or the announced outcome, either as the result of active subversion or, more corrosively, a large proportion of the Israeli public coming to believe that the election was “stolen” by the opposing camp and is therefore illegitimate. The latter is more likely to come from the pro-Netanyahu right, which is less concerned about the risk of voter suppression among Arab Israelis than it is about preventing initiatives helping Israeli expats fly home to vote in the upcoming election.

Prime Minister Netanyahu’s Likud party has already petitioned Israel’s Central Elections Committee—the non-partisan national body responsible for conducting elections—to demand it blocks such initiatives, alleging that they constitute voter bribery. If the anti-Netanyahu camp wins by one or two Knesset seats, it is likely that at least some of his supporters will point to the expats and cry foul.

The Central Elections Committee is far better prepared to manage the threat of attempted subversion on the part of external actors than the more nebulous risk of internal conspiratorial mistrust. David Zini, head of the Shin Bet (Israel’s internal security agency), recently told legislators in closed session that Iran is the leading foreign actor seeking to interfere in the Israeli vote—with Russia, China, and Turkey also involved—and that candidates themselves may be targeted.

The raw material for an Israeli version of the January 6, 2021 assault on the U. S. Capitol is in place and may or may not be kindled on October 27. If it does, and trust in the essential integrity of elections is destroyed, Israel will find itself in a constitutional crisis that it has no agreed rules to resolve.

Scenario Two: Stalemate

The second scenario—inconceivable a year ago, improbable two months ago, but now perhaps the most likely—is stalemate: an outcome where neither bloc obtains the sixty-one seats needed to form the barest majority; no combination of parties manages to negotiate a coalition; or the anti-Netanyahu camp decides it is better off going to another round of elections than attempting to form a minority government.

Israelis are intimately familiar with this situation, having lived through it repeatedly in recent history, and many now believe it is about to happen again. A survey published by Haaretz on October 1, for example, saw 49% of respondents express the view that the elections will not be determinative and that the country will likely go to another round.

Israel held five rounds of national elections between April 2019 and November 2022. Of these, two ended up in stalemate, but for different reasons. The elections of April 2019 saw Netanyahu’s right-wing bloc nominally achieve a majority, but Avigdor Lieberman’s Yisrael Beiteinu party refused to join over the Haredi miliary draft issue, leading to another round of elections five months later. Those produced another stalemate, with neither Netanyahu’s nor Benny Gantz’s Blue and White bloc able to reach sixty-one. The Knesset promptly dissolved, forcing a third election in March 2020, just as the world plunged into the Covid pandemic.

Current opinion polls suggest a stalemate, with neither the perennial Netanyahu nor his maiden chief opponent, and Gantz’s erstwhile party member, Gadi Eizenkot, likely to secure more than 52-55 seats for their respective blocs. If the polls are correct, Eizenkot can rely on 54 seats—23 for his own Yashar party, 12 from Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid’s combined Beyahad party,10 from Yair Golan’s The Democrats—remnants of the old, once hegemonic, Israeli Labor Party, plus left-secular-cosmopolitan Meretz—and 9 seats provided by the seasoned Avigdor Lieberman, still at the helm of Yisrael Beiteinu (more about him in scenario four).

Facing Eizenkot’s 54, under this scenario, will be Netanyahu’s 52-54: a diminished Likud with 20-21 seats, the Ashkenazi Haredi party United Torah Judaism (UTJ) with 8, the Sephardic Haredi party, Shas, with 7, and the three ultra-nationalist parties, Itamar Ben-Gvir’s Otzma Yehudit, 7-8, Bezalel Smotrich’s Religious Zionist party, 6, and Ofer Winter’s Amcha Yisrael party, 4. Neither bloc would be able to reach sixty-one, even if they include the only Arab party that would agree to sit in a Zionist coalition government, Ra’am, or in the unlikely event that every single one of the right-wing satellite parties currently hovering just above or below the electoral threshold make it through.

For Netanyahu, stalemate would represent a “win on points”; for Eizenkot, it would spell disaster. Under Israeli law, Netanyahu continues to serve as prime minister unless and until a new government, headed by an alternative PM, is sworn in by the Knesset. If he can force a stalemate, Netanyahu remains interim PM after October 27 and can then use all his skill to set the agenda, divide and rule, and take the country into another electoral round in April 2027 (then another and another still if he needs to) until he does to Eizenkot what he did to the now politically defunct Benny Gantz—grind him down to irrelevance.

Gadi Eizenkot has one shot to slay the dragon; if he does not win this round, he will be weaker in the next, as the anti-Bibi camp searches desperately for the next Benny, the next Gadi, to lead the charge against Bibi. Eizenkot, more politically savvy than Gantz, knows this full well, and will do everything in his power to avoid the stalemate trap. But there is another trap waiting for him in scenario five.

Scenario Three: A Netanyahu-bloc Victory

Under a third scenario, Netanyahu’s camp would win a majority to form a narrow but viable government. This could happen through a combination of several factors. First, voting rates in favor of the pro-Netanyahu camp will need to be substantially higher than for the anti-Netanyahu bloc. A low Arab-Israeli voting rate would reward the pro-Bibi camp by increasing the likelihood that small far-right parties manage to cross the electoral threshold.

Second, Netanyahu could eke out a victory if the existing members of his coalition, especially Likud, do dramatically better at the ballot box than most polls predict. Channel 14—roughly speaking, Israel’s version of Fox News—wishcasts exactly this, with Likud winning 31-32 seats, rather than the 20-22 recorded by other pollsters.

Third, the Netanyahu bloc could win if its existing members do substantially better than most polls predict and the two new right-wing satellite parties cross the electoral threshold and join a Netanyahu-led coalition. The most significant of these is Ofer Winter’s new far-right party, Amcha Yisrael, which could give Netanyahu the crucial 4-5 seats he requires to retain power. Similarly, Netanyahu could end up on top if, during coalition negotiations, yet another small satellite party, The Reservists, crosses the electoral threshold and breaks its promise not to sit in government with the ultraorthodox. Lastly, in the cauldron of post-elections coalition negotiations, Netanyahu might poach a party from the opposing camp, for example Lieberman’s Yisrael Beiteinu, or Naftali Bennett’s Beyahad. An outright Netanyahu victory remains a tall order, but it is far from inconceivable, and the momentum of the past few weeks is drifting exactly in this direction.

A Netanyahu bloc win, even if by a bare majority, would amount to a vote of confidence in the same government that orchestrated the attempted dismantlement of the rule of law in Israel and then presided over the country’s worst security disaster—a multilayered failure it has consistently refused to impartially investigate—which was followed by three years of unresolved war.

To the Israeli soft right this would be explicable in terms of Netanyahu’s grit and experience: After being punched in the face by Yahya Sinwar in the brutal terrorist invasion of October 7, 2023, the logic would be, Bibi got himself off the floor and, despite intense international pressure, proceeded to fight a determined multifront war against Israel’s mortal enemies, all of whom are now either gone (the Assad regime in Syria), broken (Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon), or diminished (Iran). The vote for Netanyahu, for this sizeable portion of Israeli society, would be justified because the war is not over and because they believe that none of the alternatives to Netanyahu—not Eizenkot, Bennett, or Lieberman, let alone Yair Lapid—would have withstood the pressures of the past three years.

Under this scenario, Netanyahu remains the default choice for the Israeli electorate—an electorate that has moved strongly to the right after October 7—not because they believe he is blameless for October 7, but because, when push comes to shove, they conclude that in the face of continued existential dangers no one is better qualified to navigate the ship. Netanyahu’s main campaign message is directed precisely at this narrative. Strewn across Israel are giant posters with his image next to a two-word caption: “Doesn’t Surrender.”

To the nationalist-religious camp, a Netanyahu victory would mean vindication and license wrapped in messianic cellophane. Like the son of the widow of Zarephath, whom the prophet Elijah brought back from the dead, Netanyahu is resurrected in an astonishing feat of political revival. The true sons of Israel are with him and have been handed a popular mandate to complete the judicial overhaul, sweep away the last remaining bastions of the liberal “deep state,” extend efforts to drive Palestinians out of Gaza, and annex Judea and Samaria.

For liberal Israelis, this outcome would signal that the Israel they were born and grew up in is no more; that the country’s DNA has irrevocably mutated to illiberalism and that—given the steady demographic tilt in favor of the nationalist-religious—they are unlikely to win another election ever again. If not now, when?

In retrospect, under this scenario, we would look back at the November 2022 election as the crucial tipping-point at which a certain Israel perished, and another was born. Viewed through this lens, October 2026 would be seen as the mere consolidation of the historic triumph of Israel’s religious right. Judaism has beaten secular Zionism; conservative Judea has vanquished liberal Israel.

For secular-liberal Israelis the loss would also mean diminished faith in the capacity of the state—a state they fight for and disproportionately fund through their taxes—to provide long-term physical and ontological security to their children. It would be read as a clear signal that the essential link between government performance and democratic accountability has been severed, and that, going forward, tribal identity politics would be so dominant that the fundamental corrective mechanisms of democracy no longer work in Israel.

Some liberal Israelis—the most cosmopolitan and mobile—will give up and leave, emigrating reluctantly into an increasingly antisemitic world. Some will take inspiration from Hungary and continue to struggle for a liberal-democratic Israel. Others will stay to defend their gradually shrinking enclaves; others still will try to moderate the transition to a religious-nationalist Israel or will join the successor regime.

Scenario Four: An Anti-Netanyahu Victory

A fourth scenario would see a narrow victory for the opposing bloc, which is united by one goal and one goal only—the removal of Netanyahu from power. The anti-Bibi camp, referred to as Gush Ha’Shinui (“the Change Bloc”) is composed of four core parties—Yashar, Beyahad, Yisrael Beiteinu, and T he Democrats—the leaders of which, with the exception of Yair Golan of The Democrats, all see themselves as the most qualified to replace Netanyahu as PM.

Until a month ago polls suggested the combined strength of the four might just achieve the 61 seats required to form a narrow but viable majority or at least reach the 57-60 seats needed for a minority government propped up from outside with the backing of the Arab-Israeli parties, who are desperate to dispatch Netanyahu, Ben-Gvir, and Smotrich.

That is no longer the case, as the momentum has drifted away from the Change Bloc over the past weeks. The polls may be off, and we can envisage a reality in which the Change Bloc wins a bare majority through a combination of a dramatically high anti-Netanyahu voting rate (here again the Arab-Israeli voting rate may prove decisive) coupled with a low pro-Netanyahu one, as disappointed Likud voters stay at home on elections day. But if the latest polls are to be believed, even if the four core members of the Change Bloc bring in Ra’am—and all except The Democrats have vowed not to do so—they are unlikely to rise above 60 seats.

To comfortably clear 61, therefore, the Change Bloc would have to first hope that Ofer Winter’s Amcha Yisrael and The Reservists cross the electoral threshold and then manage to persuade both that—in order to avoid a stalemate, and for the sake of establishing “a Zionist government” that would exclude the “anti-Zionist” Arab and Ultraorthodox parties—they have no choice but to join the Change Bloc. Israeli journalist Raviv Drucker has recently argued that Eizenkot may be able to bring Winter into his coalition by first trying to form a national unity government with Likud, and failing, so that Winter can justify his switching camps as being both reluctant and necessary to prevent Ra’am from being in government. Under such a scenario, Drucker observes, Amcha Yisrael and The Reservists would be able to demand senior cabinet positions, with Winter likely becoming Israel’s next minister of defense.

A less likely, but not entirely inconceivable, variation would have the Change Bloc poach a party currently solidly in the Netanyahu camp, possibly Shas, by bestowing lavish budgets and ministerial appointments upon it while violating their own campaign promises on key policy issues, such as a major compromise on the Haredi military draft.

The question of Haredi military service is worth lingering on for a moment as it stands at the core of the identity-based fissure between the contending camps and is by far the anti-Netanyahu bloc’s most salient argument for his replacement. The Haredi draft dispute pertains to the question of whether ultraorthodox men, long exempted from compulsory military service so they can study Torah full-time, must serve in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) like all other Jewish Israelis. The rapid demographic growth of the ultraorthodox—a population that grows by about 4% per year, the fastest rate among any population in the developed world—means that what in 1948 appeared to be a token concession by David Ben-Gurion to four hundred yeshiva students, now extends to tens of thousands of draft-age men. After two decades of failed attempts to legislate a consensual formula, in June 2024 the Israeli Supreme Court ruled unanimously that Haredi draft exemption has no legal basis and cannot continue. At the same time, the heavy burden imposed by the post-October 7 wars on the rest of Israeli society, particularly the reservists and their families, turned a simmering chronic grievance into an acute demand to sanction those who do not serve.

The IDF has since issued roughly 24,000 call-up orders, to which only about 1,200 Haredi recruits responded, while polling shows 85% of non-Haredi Jewish Israelis favor sanctioning those who refuse to share in the national defense burden. The pro-Netanyahu coalition depends on the ultraorthodox parties (United Torah Judaism and Shas) and has therefore tried to legislate the exemption back into law. Yet the pro-Netanyahu bloc itself is deeply divided on this issue, since Likud and religious-Zionist voters (Otzma Yehudit and the Religious Zionism party) serve in large numbers. In fact, the religious-Zionist community, which makes up roughly 10% of Israel’s population, has sacrificed disproportionally in the post-October 7 wars, with roughly one-third of all fallen soldiers coming from this community.

If anything can make right-leaning Israelis switch camps and side with the Change Bloc, it is the absolute knowledge that every single one of its leaders—particularly Eizenkot, who lost his son, Gal, in the December 2023 battle of Jabaliya in Gaza—is determined to increase Haredi service rates as part of a broader drive to integrate the ultraorthodox into modern Israeliness.

An outright victory for the anti-Netanyahu bloc remains a tall order, but not an impossibility, especially if it is Avigdor Lieberman who will emerge as PM under this scenario. It is Gadi Eizenkot’s Yashar party that is certain to be the largest opposition party. But this does not automatically mean Eizenkot will stand at the head of a Change Government. Israeli law provides that it is not the head of the largest political party, but the head of the party most likely to be able to form a stable government, that is invited by Israel’s president to attempt forming a coalition. In 2021, Naftali Bennett became prime minister at the head of a party with only six Knesset seats.

Something similar could happen with Lieberman this time. With his hawkish reputation, close personal ties to Ofer Winter (who reputedly despises Eizenkot), distance from the October 7 debacle, and decades of experience in senior roles—including minister of finance (2021-22), minister of defense (2016-2018), and deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs (2009-2012 and again in 2013-2015)—it is Lieberman, not Eizenkot or Bennett, who may prove to be the only enzyme capable of the alchemical feat of ousting Netanyahu.

Whether headed by Lieberman, Eizenkot, or Bennett, a narrow Change Bloc government that will see Netanyahu deposed and his current coalition partners sent into opposition will be greeted with relief by Israeli moderates as well as most international audiences. Yet unless it can be quickly enlarged—by poaching a few members of the opposition or bringing in another party—a narrow Change Government will be immediately vulnerable to internal fissures and the risk of defections. Unlike the pro-Netanyahu camp, there is no ideological glue holding an anti-Netanyahu coalition together, and the fate of a 2026 Change Government could easily replicate that of the 2021 Change Government, which disintegrated after a year.

In the longer term, the most demoralizing and dangerous outcome for the liberal camp in Israel may not be a stalemate that drags the country into another round of elections, but a fragile anti-Bibi victory that then produces a dysfunctional coalition paralyzed by endless bickering and is liable to crumble in the face of its first serious internal or security challenge.

Scenario Five: A Broad Centrist Coalition (with or without Netanyahu)

Which brings us to the final scenario: the dissolution, or at least temporary suspension or blurring, of the pro-Bibi/anti-Bibi firewall that defines all other scenarios, and the emergence of some form of broad centrist coalition.

At its broadest, such a coalition would extend from Ra’am—an Arab party whose number two is now Yoav Segalovich, a Jewish, proudly Zionist former police commissioner—and The Democrats, on the left, through Yashar, Beyahad, and The Reservists in the center, to Likud and Yisrael Beiteinu on the right. Based on current polling, such a coalition would command 82 Knesset seats, more than two-thirds of members—an enormous majority capable of passing any legislation it can agree on.

Even a somewhat more limited, but more ideologically aligned, center-right coalition composed of Yashar, Likud, Beyahad, Yisrael Beiteinu, Amcha Yisrael, and The Reservists—which would exclude the more divisive Democrats, Arab parties, and Jewish ultranationalists and ultraorthodox parties—would command some 70 seats. It would be a broad coalition capable of far-reaching reforms, including in politically sensitive areas such as military conscription, constitutional changes, and law enforcement vis-à-vis settler violence and organized crime in the Arab-Israeli community.

The temporary suspension of rivalry between antagonistic political camps is familiar to Israelis. In 1967, four days before the outbreak of the Six-Day War, Prime Minister Levi Eshkol (of the Mapai party, the predecessor of Labor) brought the Menachem Begin-led opposition Gahal bloc (precursor of Likud) into the government, uniting 111 members of Knesset in the face of an imminent existential threat. National unity governments built on Labor-Likud cooperation were also formed to save Israel from hyperinflation (1984-88) and manage the crisis presented by the collapse of the Oslo Process and outbreak of the Second Intifada (2000-2002).

What are the prospects of something similar taking shape in late 2026? The answer depends, first and foremost, on whether Israel faces either an extraordinary national emergency or an exceptional geopolitical opportunity sometime between October 28 and mid-December. War with Iran-Houthis or Turkey would constitute an example of the former, but so could the outbreak of a Third Intifada in the West Bank. The world of 2026 is, sadly, defined by the proliferation of known unknowns and unknown unknowns that could force even Netanyahu and Eizenkot together. Conversely, the imminent and credible prospect of a regional “deal of the century”—involving normalization with Saudi Arabia that is conditional on progress towards Palestinian self-determination—is an example of a positive game changer that could drive the Israeli center left and center right to temporarily unite.

Barring such a deus ex machina, the prospect of a broad centrist coalition increases dramatically if Netanyahu exits the political scene. This could happen for health reasons, by Netanyahu agreeing to a plea bargain in which he receives a preemptive presidential pardon for his criminal indictments, or through some force majeure. All three heads of the Change Bloc who are credible candidates for PM—Eizenkot, Bennett, and Lieberman—would be willing to make far-reaching concessions to a post-Netanyahu Likud, including offering his successor the prospect of a rotating premiership—a power-sharing arrangement in which two coalition leaders agree to split a government’s term, each serving as PM for part of it.

None of them, however, would be so naïve as to enter a rotation agreement with Netanyahu, who has repeatedly destroyed his opponents by making, and then breaking, rotation deals. Eizenkot in particular has had a front row seat to the undoing of his colleague, Benny Gantz, who broke his promise to his electorate and signed a rotation agreement with Netanyahu in the early months of the Covid crisis. The Netanyahu-Gantz “emergency government” was sworn in on 17 May 2020, with Netanyahu as PM and Gantz as “alternate prime minister” and defense minister, due to rotate into the premiership in November 2021. It never happened. Netanyahu let a budget vote fail and dissolved the Knesset in late December 2020, taking Israel to another round of elections in March 2021. Benny Gantz never recovered. The man who, in April 2019, stood at the helm of the mighty Blue and White party with 35 Knesset seats is now being urged by the Change Bloc to announce his withdrawal from the race; Blue and White is now utterly defunct, scoring 0% of the projected vote.

After seven years of political instability, toxic polarization, and war, Israel desperately needs a government broad enough to possess the legitimacy and stability necessary for the country to heal, reform, and rebuild. Assuming the elections scheduled for October 27 are not disrupted, a stalemate on October 28 may, just may, compel a torn and exhausted Israel to negotiate the formation of some kind of unity government.

As one wag put it after three Israeli passengers rescued Fly Dubai flight 1073 from being hijacked and crashed last month, it is Netflix that should take out a subscription on Israel.

Submission Statement: Canada will seek to conclude a trade deal with India by the end of the year as the two countries look to strengthen economic ties and diversify partnerships amid growing global uncertainty.

Negotiators from India and Canada began a fifth round of talks from Oct. 5, building on discussions that concluded last month. Prime Minister Narendra Modi is expected to visit Canada in December and sign a completed trade deal.

“The momentum is there, the energy is there to get it done,” Canadian International Trade Minister Maninder Sidhu said in an interview with Bloomberg’s Haslinda Amin. “Hopefully we will get it done this year. That is the focus.”

Canada sees opportunities to deepen ties with India in mining and food security, while also identifying infrastructure investment and nuclear energy as areas for deeper cooperation.

Trade between Canada and India is currently small. The two countries exchanged C$30.4 billion ($21.4 billion) of goods and services last year, according to Canadian government data.

“The leaders have set an ambitious target to go from C$30 billion to C$70 billion,” Sidhu said. “How are we going to get there? Many of the conversations I’ve had in Mumbai with some of the conglomerates is we want to do more on energy. We know we want to do more in critical minerals.”

He signaled Ottawa’s interest in participating in India’s expansion plans.

“As India grows, Canada grows. We want to support India,” Sidhu said. “We can help India build all the supply chains. Negotiations are always tough but we are going to do what is best for our businesses.”

Nuclear energy is another potential area of cooperation. India is opening up its tightly controlled nuclear industry to private companies as it seeks to rapidly expand atomic power generation.

That could create opportunities for Canada, which has some of the world’s largest uranium resources as well as nuclear technology and expertise, to supply fuel and participate in new projects.

Relevance: severe attack by the AKP regime against one of the few remaining opposition media, further entrenching authoritarianism in Turkey

The offices of the Turkish media Halk TV in Istanbul were raided by the police at dawn on Wednesday, October 14, abruptly halting their morning programs.

Per the channel's leadership, employees were prevented from accessing their offices and the authorities named a "temporary administrator" to replace the current board. A video shared by Halk TV on X shows the editor-in-chief Suat Toktas attempting to negotiate with the government-appointed administrator to keep the channel on air, in vain.

Halk TV was launched in 2005 by members of the Kemalist party CHP and has been critical of the Islamist-conservative AKP of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, at the time a newly-elected PM in a relatively democratic country.

Erdoğan's 23-year rule has since taken Turkey into one of the most staggering democratic backslides in the world, severely restricting personal freedoms, locking down the electoral system and suppressing dissent in the media and civil society.

Last month, Turkish authorities launched a massive crackdown against the LGBT+ community, kidnapping dozens of journalists, activists and legal professionals to "protect Turkish families and children" from gender and sexual minorities, assimilated to pedophiles and predators in the reactionary rhetoric of the AKP.

Erdoğan's regime has cemented its power by targeting journalists, taking over the overwhelming majority of the mainstream media outlets by appointing administrators and purging the newsrooms, imprisoning dozens of journalists and closing down outlets through police harassment, financial penalties and lawfare, ramping up censorship on content deemed as insulting to the president, the nation, the army or Islam, and blocking access to websites deemed undesirable.

Peak.

The Liberal government quietly ordered a pause on a modest, but important purchase of 16 U.S.-made UH-60M Black Hawk helicopters just before trade negotiations began last summer with the Trump administration, CBC News and Radio-Canada have learned.

The aircraft, which are intended for use by Canada's special forces, are manufactured by Sikorsky, a subsidiary of the U.S. defence giant Lockheed Martin.

The decision to suspend the acquisition is linked to trade and diplomatic tensions with the Trump administration, according to several sources within the government and defence industry.

The purchase had been signed off by the U.S. State Department agency that handles foreign military sales and was headed for congressional approval when the halt was ordered before trade negotiators met in Washington, according to two confidential sources.

The decision, the sources said, was partially related to the trade talks, which ultimately failed. It was also part of a wider effort by federal officials to inventory what the Canadian military planned to purchase from the United States.

U.S. President Donald Trump has repeatedly questioned Canadian sovereignty since being re-elected. He has also launched a major trade war with Canada, imposing tariffs on key sectors such as steel, aluminum and automotive manufacturing.

As Canada seeks to reduce its military reliance on the United States, the government decided that the timing was not right to purchase American helicopters without a competitive bidding process, several sources said.

CBC News is not identifying the sources because they were not authorized to speak publicly.

Since being elected in the spring of 2025, Prime Minister Mark Carney has made it a priority to boost domestic defence industrial production, establish partnerships with foreign firms operating in Canada and — only as a last resort — purchase directly from abroad.

The pause on the Black Hawk purchase comes as the Carney government continues to review whether it will purchase a full order of F-35 stealth fighters, which are also manufactured by Lockheed Martin.

The government ordered a review of that plan in the late winter of 2025 and has yet to decide whether it will buy all 88 fighters as originally planned.

Canada has committed to buy 16 F-35s, but has also ordered the parts for more than a dozen others.

Whenever Canada — or other countries — buy U.S. military gear, the purchaser is required to request permission through the U.S. Foreign Military Sales program.

Once reviewed by officials, the deal is sent to American lawmakers who have 15 days to object before it becomes official.

A spokesperson for the agency overseeing Canada's military procurement suggested options other than the Black Hawks could be considered.

"The government of Canada continues to evaluate options to meet the needs of the special operations forces," said Sofiya Sapeha, spokesperson for Stephen Fuhr, the parliamentary secretary responsible for military procurement.

"Canada remains in contact with the relevant partners and continues to review all information necessary for decision-making."

The Black Hawks are intended to replace the special forces' use of the CH-146 Griffon, which is more than three decades old and significantly inferior in terms of military operations.

One of the reasons Canada's commandos were keen on the Black Hawk was because of its range and robustness for operations over vast distances in the Arctic.

The UH-60 has a typical combat radius of about 595 kilometres, which can be extended by air-to-air refuelling. In that case, its range goes out to 2,250 kilometres. The Griffon's normal combat range is up to 656 kilometres, but can be fitted with external fuel tanks that take it up to 909 kilometres.

Special forces have been using the Griffon since their inception as a separate unit within the Canadian military in the early 1990s. The helicopter is currently flown by 427 Special Operations Aviation Squadron.

Retired major-general Denis Thompson, who commanded special operations troops, said the difference between the two helicopters is stark.

"In some ways you're comparing apples and oranges because a Griffon is a small, agile helicopter better suited for temperate climates and frankly better suited for urban operations than something as large as a Black Hawk," Thompson said.

"Range is important and the fact that it's a military design, a helicopter designed expressly for the military, means that it is just more robust and it can stand up to more punishment than the Griffon."

Thompson questioned the political calculus, but said he understands the way Canadians feel about the Trump administration.

"When we buy a piece of equipment, we're not hanging on to it for the two years that are left in Mr. Trump's mandate," Thompson said. "We're hanging on to them for 20, 30 years. And so what's important is to make sure that we buy the equipment that Canadian Armed Forces need and that we look to the long-term and not short-term political gain."

Earlier this year, Policy Magazine published the results of a poll that indicated that 62 per cent of Canadians disagree with purchasing military equipment from the United States. Similarly, Abacus Data found that 64 per cent support an immediate halt to U.S. military purchases.

"I know it's difficult to explain that to the public, but that's what needs to be done," said Thompson.

He said equipment like the Black Hawk and F-35 weren't selected "for political reasons, at least not from the military standpoint. They were selected because they are the best piece, the most suitable piece, of equipment to fulfil the task that the military believes it might have to fill."

Defence analyst Justin Massie said the government is also clearly grappling with military procurement projects that were set in motion before the trade tensions began.

"What is changing is not so much the strategy as the political discomfort of publicly announcing purchases of American military equipment." said Massie, a political science professor at Université du Québec à Montréal.

A spokesperson for Lockheed Martin highlighted the firm's willingness to continue working with the Canadian Armed Forces, without commenting on the status of the acquisition process.

"We are ready to support international customers wishing to acquire the latest-generation UH-60M Black Hawk helicopter through the Foreign Military Sales program," said the spokesperson, Amanda Hauck.

According to government and defence industry sources, Ottawa is hesitating to approve further military purchases from the United States, or even announce contracts already signed with American firms.

For instance, a recent Department of National Defence contract for specialized cloud computing services with California-based Google has not yet been announced. This contract involves storing and protecting classified information related to national security.

Another contract for a ground vehicle crew training system is reportedly slated for the U.S. firm Raytheon but has not been announced, sources say.

Earlier this year, the government waited months before confirming a contract to purchase M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) from Lockheed Martin.

Submission Statement: Canadian billionaire Prem Watsa’s Fairfax Financial Holdings Ltd. will acquire a stake in IDBI Bank Ltd. for 528.78 billion rupees ($5.6 billion), making it the biggest foreign investment in India’s rapidly growing financial services sector.

Fairfax Financial will own 60.72% of IDBI Bank, according to Arunish Chawla, secretary at the Department of Investment and Public Asset Management, valuing the lender at around 871 billion rupees. The sale isat a 11% discount to Wednesday’s closing price of 90.4 rupees with the Indian government and Life Insurance Corp. set to retain a total of 34% stake in the lender.

Fairfax joins a wave of foreign firms expanding in India, drawn by the burgeoning wealth class and the world’s fastest-growing major economy. Japanese lenders alone spent more than $6 billion combined, buying stakes in Indian banks last year, including deals by Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group Inc. and Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group Inc.

The latest breakthrough in the IDBI stake sale will be seen as a shot in the arm for Modi who is seeking to convert India into a developed economy by 2047. To achieve his ambition of boosting gross domestic product 10 times to about $30 trillion by 2047, funding from banks must increase to about 130% of GDP from around 56%.

In recent months, India has also accelerated stake sales in some of its largest state-owned companies, helping push disinvestment proceeds above the total raised in each of the past three fiscal years. The government is seeking to shore up finances as the oil-importing nation faces mounting fiscal strain from the energy shock spurred by the Middle East war.

Proceeds from the IDBI Bank stake sale would provide a significant boost to the government’s goal of raising 800 billion rupees through asset sales this fiscal year.

The acquisition of India’s sixth-largest private bank by assets significantly expands Watsa-owned Fairfax’s India presence. Fairfax already has investments in CSB Bank Ltd. and shadow lender IIFL Capital Services Ltd.

Affordability is a top concern in the upcoming municipal election, but it feels like housing for the middle class is not at the forefront of anyone’s campaign. It should be.

Housing is most people’s single largest monthly expense, yet candidates’ promises are too timid to address the scale of the crisis.

The political logic is understandable: voters in municipal elections are disproportionately both older and homeowners, and policies that could lower home prices are a political third rail. 

However, new polling data finds that Canadians understand that home prices are too high to be affordable. Perhaps housing prices aren’t as untouchable as some politicians assume.

The Missing Middle Initiative is a member of the Homes and Growth Coalition, a collection of housing-related organizations dedicated to developing policy solutions to end Canada’s housing crisis. Last month, one of our coalition partners, Data Sciences, conducted a poll of over 4,000 Canadians to help us better understand how Canadians view the crisis, what they think housing policy goals should be and how governments should navigate trade-offs.

Conventional wisdom about keeping home prices from falling doesn’t match what most people prioritize. For every respondent who believed government policy should prioritize keeping home values up, two believed prices should fall. Even among homeowners aged 50 and older, belief in the two values was roughly even. And when asked what the strongest sign would be that the housing crisis was improving, the most popular response was “house prices no longer rising faster than incomes,” which was chosen by half of all Canadians, as well as half of all residents of the Greater Toronto Area.

Based on responses to all priority questions, Data Sciences found that only 15 per cent of respondents could be classified as prioritizing the status quo. Those respondents believe that housing policies should be based on the priorities of protecting property values, preserving neighbourhood character and helping seniors age in place. While this group may be louder and may be disproportionately likely to vote in a municipal election, their overall numbers are quite modest.

Politicians thus have more room to move on housing than they believe, giving them space to make the reforms needed to lower construction costs and increase the supply of new homes.

When evaluating a housing plan, we look for whether it removes barriers to build where demand exists (including in existing neighbourhoods), cuts the absurdly high taxes and fees that drive up costs, and reduces the time it takes from proposals to shovels in the ground.

In Toronto’s municipal election, mayoral candidates Brad Bradford and Olivia Chow have both proposed policies to increase affordable housing and reduce renovictions, policies that are vital to renters.

However, our poll shows that while about 80 per cent of renters under 50 aspire to own a home one day, less is being done for them. Neither campaign is highlighting fixing the zoning bylaws that have made multiplexes tough to build despite being technically legal, or allowing bigger buildings in neighbourhoods. To his credit, though, Bradford spearheaded the push to allow fourplexes citywide and has advocated for change throughout most of his time on council. We do wonder whether he can stand up to pushback from the inner suburbs that fought against sixplexes, since those areas are his likely voters. 

Chow, like Bradford, supports upzoning on major streets and near transit, but refused to use her strong mayor powers to allow sixplexes citywide, granting exemptions to inner suburbs where lots are often large enough for multiplexes.

One encouraging highlight is Bradford’s land transfer tax (LTT) cut. The respondents of the Data Sciences poll identified “the costs of buying, selling and moving” as the top barrier preventing them from moving; lowering or eliminating the LTT substantially reduces those costs.

If we want more supply, though, candidates should really consider long-term removal of the high taxes, including development charges, that cities place on new developments.

The data is clear: two out of three Canadians believe helping home prices go down is a higher priority than preserving property values. The message to politicians is clear: you can be ambitious with bold ideas to improve affordability. We can only hope that they will listen.

stolen from the fine folks at NCD

Submission Statement: Indonesia will in the coming days introduce some of the world’s most sweeping rules on halal certification, requiring businesses selling everything from clothing to cosmetics and toilet paper to demonstrate their products are permissible under Islam.

From Sunday, the country will require most consumer goods — including tools and office supplies — to be certified as part of efforts to ensure transparency for customers often faced with confusing labels. Products not certified as halal will bear a non-halal label, potentially deterring customers.

The rules are expected to wreak havoc on the flow of goods into Indonesia, which manufacturers view as an attractive market due to its 280mn-strong population, the majority of whom are Muslim. Global brands such as Pepsi, Coca-Cola, P&G, Uniqlo, Nestlé and Unilever are expected to be affected. 

Indonesia’s halal rules, which will apply to imported and locally made goods, are the strictest among Muslim countries, which typically mandate halal certification for food and beverages. Even more conservative Islamic countries such as Saudi Arabia and Malaysia do not demand certification for items such as clothing.

The rule, first flagged as far back as 2014, mandates manufacturers to obtain the certification prior to entering Indonesia from foreign bodies that are approved by Indonesia’s national halal agency. It also requires companies to have a “halal supervisor” of Muslim faith.

Manufacturers are struggling due to a lack of adequate certifying bodies in foreign countries, traceability constraints and the difficulty in overhauling supply chains, according to business groups and foreign governments.

The EU has warned Indonesia of “serious supply chain disruptions”, according to people familiar with the matter. Brussels has cited the complexity of tracing the halal status of ingredients in cosmetics, pharmaceuticals and chemicals in particular, saying it was “practically unfeasible”, the people said.  

While food and beverage companies are typically equipped to meet halal regulations in Muslim countries, other industries are not. The EU has fewer than 10 certifying bodies for cosmetics, the bloc says.

Submission Statement: Barclays Plc is preparing to re-enter India’s equity capital markets business, the bank’s local chief said, as the London-based bank adds bankers and capital to compete in one of the world’s busiest markets for share sales.

The move would mark Barclays’ return to India’s ECM business after nearly a decade, allowing it to compete for underwriting mandates as the IPO pipeline stays strong after two straight years of unprecedented deals. The boom has also drawn interest from banks including Emirates NBD PJSC and DBS Group Holdings Ltd. in expanding their presence in India.

Barclays is investing across its investment bank, the largest part of its India business, as well as its corporate and private banks, according to Kumar. The lender has injected more than £500 million ($664 million) of capital over the past five years, added bankers over the past year and is investing in technology, he said.

Barclays has operated in India’s GIFT City for about five years and plans to keep investing there given the hub’s fiscal and tax advantages, he said.

“Given the opportunity that India offers, we continue to invest in talent,” he said.

Submission Statement: Glencore shares started trading on the Australian stock market on Wednesday in a boost to the ASX’s standing as a global hub for mining stocks. The Swiss-based commodity giant, which has a market capitalisation of £69bn, is already listed in London and Johannesburg but has opted to issue stock in Sydney to tap into a mining-savvy investor base.

Chief executive Gary Nagle has said that Glencore expected strong demand from Australian investors for its stock, having met multiple shareholders keen to invest in the mining company in recent days in Australia. “You want to go to markets where mining is appreciated and mining is understood,” he said, describing Australians as “smart investors”.

The float of a major name is a boost for the ASX after data centre operator Firmus abandoned its $30bn IPO last week following poor investor demand. The listing would have been Australia’s second-largest on record. The ASX said Glencore was joining 850 mining and resource companies already listed on its exchange.

“ASX is a world leader in metals and mining listings over the past decade,” said Anthony Attia, who joined as its chief executive this month. “Our goal, especially in a world where capital is global, is to champion these opportunities and highlight the depth of this market.” 

Glencore employs 16,000 people in Australia with coal, zinc, copper and nickel assets that include mines and smelters.

The stock will offer Australian investors exposure to a copper player that is not tied to iron ore, as is the case with the country’s largest miners. Glencore also operates a large commodities trading division, which Nagle described as “a differentiator for us versus our peers”. 

The chief executive said Glencore had met some of Australia’s large pension funds — the “superannuation” groups that have a significant influence over the stock market.

Many of those funds have avoided investing in coal in recent years due to climate and social policies, but Nagle was confident that Glencore’s approach to its coal assets in Australia — including a plan to wind them down over time — aligned with some of those policies.

“There doesn’t seem to be the type of concerns we saw two or three years ago,” he said, arguing that the global energy crisis triggered by the Middle East conflict this year had “sharpened people’s minds”.